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LET SLEEPING REGS LIE: A DIATRIBE ON
REGULATION A's FUTILITY BEFORE AND AFTER
THE J.O.B.S. ACT
Neal Newman*
Did Congress do the right thing when it attempted to revise Regulation
A through Title IV of the J.O.B.S. Act or was their legislative effort an
exercise in futility?
On April 4 2012, President Obama signed into law the J.O.B.S.
(Jumpstart Our Business Startups) Act. The Act's intent is to ease the
regulatory burden on smaller companies when issuing securities in both
private and public offerings. This paper's specific focus is on the Act's
Title IV. Title IV makes revisions to Regulation A, a private securities
offering exemption promulgated under the Securities Act of 1933.
A big problem with Regulation A historically is that the provisions
were burdensome, costly, and time consuming. In addition to a Federal
component that required the issuer to file an offering statement with the
Securities and Exchange Commission, Regulation A also requires that the
issuer meet filing requirements within each state jurisdiction in which the
issuer planned on offering its securities.' The heavy compliance burden
was coupled with the fact that the most you could raise through a
Regulation A offering was $5 million.2 As a result, Regulation A has
3historically been all but dormant in use.
* Neal F. Newman, Professor, Texas A&M University School of Law. Special thanks are
owed to my family who tolerated my considerable time away from home and to law students
Yohana Mantrana and Alesya Vasilenko for their valuable research and help in getting to the finished
product. Also thanks to Texas A&M University School of Law for supporting my work though
the provision of a summer research grant.
1. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012) (exempting under Section 18 of the Securities
Act of 1933 certain securities and securities offerings from state registration, but not
exempting offerings made under Regulation A (pre-J.O.B.S. Act)).
2. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) (pre-J.O.B.S. Act) amended by 17 C.F.R. pt. 230
(2015).
3. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), at 9, Figure 1.
The Report conveys Regulation A's declining use which peaked at 116 filings in 1997 and
has declined steadily through 2011 where there were only 19 Regulation A filings in 2011.
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The J.O.B.S. Act's Title IV has sought to remedy this by making
several changes to Regulation A; the most noteworthy of which involves
raising the offering ceiling from $5 million to $50 million. The question
then is will this be enough to offset the compliance burdens that historically
have kept issuers from using Regulation A. This paper takes a critical look
at the changes to Regulation A mandated under the J.O.B.S. Act and
concludes that Congress missed the mark yet again with its Regulation A
revisions.
Congress should have left Regulation A alone as a poorly conceived
regulation that was flawed at its initial inception. Not quite an expos6, this
paper calls to task Congress' legislative thought process in the area of
securities offering exemptions and seeks to hold them accountable for
creating a revised offering exemption without regard for its potential end
users.
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INTRODUCTION
Though the law is a learned profession steeped in the art of problem
solving, in some instances, the solution is simply to leave it alone as hard
as that may be for us to accept. And that's okay. Accepting this reality
frees us to deal with other endeavors more worthy of our time.
On April 8, 2014, Luis A. Aguilar, one of the five appointed Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) Commissioners, stood before an
audience of anxious state securities regulators and used all the tact and
diplomacy that he could bring to bear to ease their concerns regarding the
Commission's proposed rulemaking changes to the private securities
exemption known as Regulation A. The proposed rules then being
considered would greatly reduce the state regulator's role in overseeing
Regulation A offerings in their respective jurisdictions .
In a similar reaction to the Commission's proposed rulemaking, on
June 3, 2014, a group of 20 House Democrats signed a letter written to
SEC Chairman Mary Jo White stating that the SEC's proposed "Regulation
A Plus" rules preempt state law too broadly, contrary to Congress' intent.
Finally, the North American Securities Administrators Association
(NASAA) sent a strongly worded letter to the Commission, attacking the
4. Luis A. Aguilar, SEC Comm'r, Comments at the North American Securities
Administrators Association Annual NASAA/SEC 19(d) Conference in Washington D.C.
(Apr. 8, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/News/SpeechlDetail/Speech/ 1370541436767#.VMpWgxfnbcs,
archived at http://perma.cc/52BB-69XW.
5. Letter from Stephen F. Lynch et al., Members of Cong., to Honorable Mary Jo
White, Chair, SEC (June 3, 2014), https://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1l-13/s71113-
114.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/P9AD-C2MZ.
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proposed changes to Regulation A on many fronts and questioning the
proposed rules' legality. What started as a bid to make Regulation A a
more user friendly7  private placement exemption for issuers has
mushroomed into a quagmire that has done nothing but reveal the flaws
that existed before Regulation A was modified and that still remain after its
revisions.
At times lawmakers get off track because they fail to ask the right
question. During senate hearings on Regulation A and other capital
formation issues, Senator Shelby asked, "[Aire there any changes that
could be made to make Regulation A more appealing . .. .?" But the more
pointed question should have been, "Does Regulation A fill any unmet
need or purpose in the realm of private securities offerings?" If Congress
would have explored the situation by asking the appropriate threshold
question, their whole approach to Regulation A may have taken a
completely different path. Instead, Congress has engaged in a futile effort
to revive Regulation A with legislative action through Title IV of the
Jumpstart Our Business Startups (J.O.B.S.) Act.9
Congress' effort to revive Regulation A was an ill-conceived endeavor
that never should have occurred. Congress should have accepted the fact
that Regulation A is a private placement option that has moved to near
extinction for two reasons: 1) Regulation A at its inception was too
cumbersome, too time-consuming, and too costly to be a viable option for
most issuers, where the maximum amount of money an issuer could raise in
6. See Comment Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, Inc.,
to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-I -
13/s7113-75.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G3V4-NP9J. (questioning the Commission's
authority to define key terms, arguing for state-run alternatives to the proposed regime, and
providing additional cost-benefit analysis to highlight problems with the proposed regime).
7. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors-Part
I: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 25-26
(2011) (inquiry from Sen. Richard Shelby, Ranking Member, Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- 112shrg74738/html/CHRG-
11 2shrg74738.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/2G6S-JMU6.
8. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors-Part
1: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 25-26
(2011) (inquiry from Sen. Richard Shelby, Ranking Member, Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-112shrg74738/html/CHRG-
11 2shrg74738.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/2G6S-JMU6.
9. See generally Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (J.O.B.S. Act), Pub. L. No. 12-
106, 126 Stat. 306 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS- I 2hr3606enr/pdf/BILLS-
1l2hr3606enr.pdf?n-07083, archived at http://perma.cc/D7D2-VG8W; see also Jumpstart
Our Business Startups Act tit. IV ("Small Company Capital Formation").
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any twelve month period was $5 million;'o and 2) a closer look at the few
issuers who decided to go the Regulation A route reveal that their filings
could have been achieved under a less costly, less cumbersome exemption
if they had given the threshold decision of which exemption might be best a
bit more thought." This paper delves into this matter to reveal the
conclusion that Congress should have come to on its own had they asked
the right questions. No attempt should have been made to revive
Regulation A's use. Regulation A was a flawed and ill-conceived
exemption at its inception and should have been left to extinction. This
paper will lay out the reasons for this conclusion.
The paper is organized as follows: Section I provides foundational
knowledge regarding the J.O.B.S. Act in general and Title IV, the provision
that revises Regulation A, in particular. Section II discusses the
cumbersome aspects of Regulation A to bolster the reasons for Regulation
A's historical lack of use. Section III supplies actual data showing
Regulation A's use, or lack thereof, compared to other private offering
exemptions that are less expensive, less time-consuming, and less
cumbersome for the issuer. Section IV then explains the modifications the
J.O.B.S. Act has made to Regulation A, the most notable of which is
raising Regulation A's offering cap from $5 million to $50 million. There
are other revisions as well, some of which have been and remain the basis
of controversy and debate as of this article's publication date. The
revisions and controversies surrounding some of the proposed changes will
be discussed in Section IV as well. Section V posits the question of
whether the modifications to Regulation A as promulgated under the
J.O.B.S. Act will manifest itself in the form of issuers selecting Regulation
A with more frequency compared to historical numbers. Section V takes
the position that Regulation A as modified will not result in issuers
selecting Regulation A with any greater frequency and explains the reasons
for this conclusion. Section VI explains one of the more controversial
aspects of Regulation A: namely the SEC's final rules which preempt
Regulation A filings from all state registration and filing requirements for
offerings exceeding $20 million. The intent is to explain the controversy
surrounding this significant change to Regulation A and tie it into the
overall argument as to why Regulation A's cumbersome aspects far
outweigh any benefits that might be derived from using the exemption.
Section VII suggests changes that could be made to Regulation A that
10. Securities Act of 1933, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) (amended by 17 C.F.R. §
230.251(b) (2015)).
11. See discussion infra Part IV (arguing that exemptions issued under Regulation A are
rare and have been improperly assigned).
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might give it a better chance at being a viable offering exemption. Finally,
Section VIII concludes.
I. THE J.O.B.S. ACT AND REGULATION A
A. The J.O.B.S. Act in General
On April 5, 2012, President Obama signed into law the Jumpstart Our
Business Startups (J.O.B.S.) Act.12 The Act's intended purpose is to ease
the regulatory burden on small businesses when going public and operating
as publicly held companies.13  The Act consists of seven titles. 4  This
article focuses on the Act's Title IV - Small Company Capital Formation.
Title IV undertakes the noble but questionable endeavor of revising a
flawed and seldom-used securities offering exemption with the hope of
making the exemption a more viable and appealing option for issuers
seeking a private placement exemption." The exemption in question is
referred to as Regulation A.'6  Prior to the proposed revisions under the
J.O.B.S. Act, Regulation A allowed those filing under its exemption to
offer up to $5 million worth of equity shares without having to register
them."
But Regulation A historically has not been used very much and over
12. Mark Landler, Obama Signs Bill to Promote Start-Up Investments, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 5, 2012, at Al2, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/06/us/politics/obama-signs-bill-to-
ease-investing-in-start-ups.html?_r-0&pagewanted=print, archived at
https://perma.cc/W5AT-P6V2.
13. See Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors-
Part 1: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. I
(2011) (opening statement of Sen. Tim Johnson, Chairman, Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 12shrg74738/html/CHRG-
I 12shrg74738.htm, archived at http://perma.ccl2G6S-JMU6 ("We are here to discuss how
to help startups and businesses get access to the capital they need to grow and to create new
jobs, while protecting investors.").
14. See J.O.B.S. Act, Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126 Stat. 306, § 2 (2012),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/BILLS- I 2hr3606enr/pdf/BILLS-
ll2hr3606enr.pdf?n-07083, archived at http://perma.ccID7D2-VG8W (listing the seven
titles in the table of contents).
15. See Shelby supra n. 8 at 25-26. (during the hearing, Senator Shelby noted when
speaking to Meredith Cross, Director, Division of Corporate Finance, Securities and
Exchange Commission, "As you noted in your testimony, last year [2010] only three
Regulation A filings were qualified by the SEC. So far this year not a single Regulation A
filing has been cleared").
16. Regulation A, 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.263 (2015).
17. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (pre-J.O.B.S. Act) (amended by 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b))
(2015).
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time has become close to dormant as companies have sought other less
cumbersome exemptions that allow them to raise more money in less time
and at a fraction of the cost." In response to Regulation A's historical lack
of use, Congress has made revisions to Regulation A through the J.O.B.S.
Act's Title IV with the intent of making Regulation A a more appealing
and viable option. Under these revisions, Regulation A is now referred to
as Regulation A+.' 9
This paper critiques this endeavor and questions both the wisdom and
necessity of doing so. Regulation A was a flawed exemption at its
inception. With its Regulation A revival, the J.O.B.S. Act has only
succeeded in sparking debate from regulators and politicians, neither of
whom have likely taken the time to critically assess the situation. If they
had, they would have come to the same conclusion: let a sleeping
regulation lie. Regulation A was well on its way to extinction. As will be
discussed later in this paper, there was only one qualified Regulation A
offering in 2011. This is compared to 8,194 Regulation D offerings where
the offering size was $5 million or less.2 0 Congress should have left
Regulation A alone and let it continue to be phased out of use altogether.
B. Title IV - Small Company Capital Formation
As mentioned earlier, Title IV revises Regulation A with the intent of
making it more appealing to issuers. 2 1 The most significant Regulation A
modification was the increased cap on its offering size. The J.O.B.S. Act
raised the Regulation A offering limit from $5 million to $50 million.2 2
Additionally, Title IV has enacted counteracting modifications to offset the
18. For example, Rule 506 of Regulation D is the most often used Private offering
exemption for reasons that will be explained later in this paper. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).
See also U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), at 10-11 (Report
details how issuers choose Regulation D's Rule 506 with much more frequency than
Regulation A).
19. Samuel S. Guzik, Regulation A+: A Sleeping Giant For Small Business Capital
Formation?, CROWDFUND INSIDER (Apr. 28, 2014, 8:00 AM),
http://www.crowdfundinsider.com/2014/04/37035-regulation-sleeping-giant-small-business-
capital-formation/, archived at http://perma.cc/CDY9-3PJZ.
20. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), at 11.
21. See Shelby, supra note 8, at 25-26.
22. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(b)(2)(A) (2012) ("The aggregate offering amount of all securities
offered and sold within the prior 12-month period in reliance on the exemption added in
accordance with this paragraph shall not exceed $50,000,000.").
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increased exposure to investors as a result of raising its cap. 23  The
problems with this and the futility of these modifications will also be
discussed in depth throughout the remainder of this article.
II. REGULATION A's CUMBERSOME ASPECTS - (PRE J.O.B.S.
ACT)
Historically, Regulation A was not used frequently. From a
compliance standpoint, Regulation A was cumbersome and the most you
could raise through the offering was $5 million. Those aspects made
Regulation A an exemption with little appeal.24  A discussion of those
cumbersome Regulation A aspects follows.
A. The Federal Component
An issuer wishing to file under Regulation A must first file an offering
statement referred to as a Form 1-A. 25 This form consists of thirty-five
pages of requested information, including business information, financial
information, risk factors, use of proceeds, principal stockholders, etc.26
Securities professionals often compared the Form 1-A disclosures to a full-
blown registration statement.27 The required disclosures are very similar in
terms of the breadth and depth of required information. Once all the
required disclosures have been provided, a well prepared Form 1-A
requires twenty-five to thirty-five pages of disclosed information. 28 Even
23. For example, where the issuer's offering size exceeds $20 million, the issuer must
include audited financial statements in the offering circular Regulation A Offering
Statement under the Securities Act of 1933, Form 1-A. 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (2015). See 17
C.F.R. § 230.252(a) (2015)(prescribing the informational filing and disclosure requirements
for Regulation A offerings); 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (requiring the use of Form I-A for
Regulation A offerings); S.E.C., Form I-A - Regulation A Offering Statement Under the
Securities Act of 1933, pt. F/S(c), https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forml-a.pdf, archived
at https://perma.cc/H6QP-GU3Q (requiring audited financial statements for Tier 2
Regulation A offerings).
24. See U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), at II (showing
the number of Regulation A filings compared to other exemptions).
25. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(d)(1)(i) (2014), amended by 17 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2015).
26. SEC, Form I-ASEC33, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forml-a.pdf, archived at
https://perma.cc/H6QP-GU3Q.
27. In drawing upon the author's own experiences as a practitioner spanning from
1998-2003, 1 never considered Regulation A as a viable option for my clients based in large
part on the significant amount of time and expense that would be required to complete the
Form-I A Offering Statement.
28. See, e.g., Lightspeed Sys., Inc., Regulation A Offering Statement Under the
[Vol. 18:1
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though Regulation A technically does not require registration, the issuer
must file the Form 1-A with the SEC where it will go through a
qualification process. 29 An SEC examiner reviews the document to make
sure the disclosures have comported with the Form 1-A's disclosure
requirements. When the examiner is satisfied, then the SEC will qualify
the offering.30
According to a General Accountant's Office (GAO) study, the
Regulation A qualification process took an average of 228 days,3 ' almost
two-thirds of a year. The GAO report (Report) did not offer any
explanations as to why the qualification process took so long to complete,
but after reviewing over forty Regulation A filings, a plausible answer was
evident. Many of the Regulation A filings sampled were prepared without
counsel's assistance. This conclusion was based on the fact that these
filings were either hand written or written in such a way that it was clear
the offering was not drafted by an attorney. Much of the Form 1-A's
required disclosures were either inadequate or non-existent in the offering
statements that were reviewed. Thus, the likely reason for the extended
timeline to qualification was the considerable back and forth between the
Commission and the filer to ensure that the filer complied with all of the
Form 1-A mandates. Accordingly, if an issuer took the additional steps of
hiring accountants and lawyers to assist in preparing the offering statement,
this would add considerable expense to a filing process that again, at the
most, would yield gross proceeds of $5 million.32
B. The State Component
In addition to the cumbersome federal component just described,
Regulation A has a state registration component as well . Layering the
Securities Act of 1933 (Form 1-A) (June 30, 2008),
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/08/9999999997-08-030442, archived at
http://perma.cclUY3B-7D6C (example of a Form 1-A that contained 121 pages of
disclosure filed in 2008 by a company called Lightspeed Systems, Inc.).
29. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), at 11-12
(providing a detailed description of qualification process).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(g) (2015).
31. See U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS, supra note 29, at 12
(according to SEC data obtained covering the periods from 2002-2011).
32. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) (pre-J.O.B.S. Act) amended by 17 C.F.R. pt. 230
(2015).
33. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012) (exempting under Section 18 of the Securities
Act of 1933 certain securities and securities offerings from state registration, but not
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state components on top of an already burdensome federal qualification
process makes for a regime that has caused many issuers to turn to other
options. Under the state registration component, the issuer has to register
in each state that the issuer is considering offering its securities.34 The
difficulty here is that each state has its own and often varied registration
requirements.35 To properly register an offering, the issuer has to make
sure it complies with the registration process for each state. 6
To conform, the issuer has to research the registration requirements in
each jurisdiction. Adding to the difficulty, each jurisdiction has different
filing requirements. Some states merely have a "disclosure" review
where the issuer simply comports with the disclosure requirements in that
jurisdiction.3 But some states also have a "merit review" where the state
regulator not only reviews the issuer for adequate disclosure but also makes
a merit assessment. 4 0 These merit reviews take such forms as not passing
on the filing if the issuer does not show positive earnings within the three
years preceding the offering. 4 ' The combined weight of the cumbersome
federal qualification requirement and the numerous state registration
requirements is more than enough to push Regulation A down and
ultimately off the list of exempt transaction possibilities.
II. REGULATION A AND ITS LACK OF HISTORICAL USE
Due to all that historically was involved with a Regulation A filing,
Regulation A has gone from an exemption that was used sparingly in the
early '90's to one that today is close to dormant in relative terms. For
example, in 1992 there were only 20 Regulation A filings, of which all 20
were qualified. 4 2 Regulation A filings peaked around 1997 when issuers
exempting offerings made under Regulation A (pre-J.O.B.S. Act)).
34. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS, supra note 29, at 13.
35. Id. at 13.
36. See id. at 13-14 (describing the two general methods for registering securities
offerings in specific states).
37. But cf. id. at 13-19 (pointing out that state regulators are putting forth the effort to
streamline the process).
38. See id. at 13-14 (describing the two general methods for registering securities
offerings in specific states).
39. Id. at 13.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 14.
42. See id. at 9, fig. I (showing the number of Regulation A filings between 1992 and
2011 and the Regulation A offerings that were actually qualified during that same period).
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filed 116 Regulation A offering circulars. 4 3 But of the 116 filings, only 56
(roughly half) actually worked their way through the Commission's review
process and obtained qualification." By 2011, the Regulation A filing
number dwindled to nineteen with the Commission only qualifying one of
those nineteen Regulation A filings;4 5 numbers never lie. Regulation A
with its comprehensive offering circular, coupled with its state filing
requirements, presented an option that was cumbersome, time-consuming,
and costly and therefore was regularly passed over for other more
appealing options.
A. Comparing Regulation A's Use with Other Exemptions
In making the argument for the J.O.B.S. Act's futility in revising
Regulation A, it is enlightening to look at the other available private
exemption options to appreciate what makes the other choices preferable.
In the GAO study mentioned earlier, the GAO compared Regulation A's
use with other potential exempt offerings. The GAO's results were
revealing. The report looked at the period covering the years 2008-2011
and compared Regulation A with Regulation D's Rule 506.46 Regulation
D's Rule 506 is another exempt offering available under the Securities Act
which allows issuers to offer securities to private investors without having
to register those securities.4 7 Under Regulation D's Rule 506, the issuer
can transact an exempt offering with no dollar limit.48 But the investors
must either be accredited or have a threshold level of financial
sophistication to participate in the offering. 4 9 Also, the rule requires that
financial disclosures be made to those investors who are not accredited
investors.o Further (and stated with emphasis), Rule 506 is exempt from
43. See id. at 5-6 (noting that although the issuer that relies on Regulation A is not
required to register the securities with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the issuer
still must file its Regulation A offering circular with the Commission for review and
approval); see id. at 6 (noting that once the offering has been approved it is deemed to be
"Qualified.").
44. Id. at 8.
45. See id., at 9, fig.1 (showing the number of Regulation A filings between 1992 and
2011 and the Regulation A offerings that were actually qualified during that same period).
46. Id.at10-11.
47. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015) (providing exemption for limited offers and sales
without regard to the dollar amount as along as all the other criteria are met, there is no
offering limit).
48. Id.
49. Id. at § 230.506 (b)(2), (c)(2).
50. See id. at (b)(1)(stating that the issuer must satisfy the terms and conditions of
section 230.501 and section 230.502). Rule 502(b) specifies the financial disclosures that
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all state filing and registration requirements."' The exemption from the
state filing requirements is granted explicitly through Section 18(b)(4)(D)
of the Securities Act of 1933.52 Rule 506 is being used for comparison
because it was by far the predominate choice for private placement
offerings. The numbers by comparison were staggering.
The GAO Report did not obtain Regulation D numbers for 2008 and
2009. But during those two years, the number of Regulation A offerings
that were QUALIFIED were eight and three respectively.5 In 2010 there
were six qualified Regulation A offerings. By comparison, in 2010 there
were a total of 7,517 exempt offerings filed under Regulation D's Rule
506.6 And to achieve the most meaningful comparison possible, the
Report only included those Regulation D offerings that were for $5 million
or less, the maximum Regulation A offering amount prior to its change to
$50 million under the J.O.B.S. Act. Likewise in 2011, there was only one
qualified Regulation A offering compared to 8,194 offerings filed under
Regulation D's Rule 506 for offering amounts of $5 million or less.58 Rule
506 is vibrant and often used. Regulation A by comparison has been
trending downward since its peak of fifty-seven qualified offerings in
1998.
the issuer must provide to certain investors; namely non-accredited investors. 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(b) (2015). Generally, the larger the offering, the more financial and non-financial
information the issuer is required to provide to its investors. Id.
51. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2012) (exempting offerings issued under section 4(a)(2)
of the Securities Act of 1933 (codified at 17 U.S.C.§ 77d(2) (2012)). Regulation D Rule
506 is a Regulation issued under section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and is
therefore exempt. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(E) (2012).
52. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(D) (2012) (exempting offerings issued under section
4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 (codified at 17 U.S.C.§ 77d(2) (2012)). Regulation D
Rule 506 is a Regulation issued under section 4(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 and is
therefore exempt. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(E) (2012).
53. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), supra note 29, at
10.
54. Id. at l1, tbl. 1.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 10, 11 tbl. 1.
58. Id. at 11 tbl.1. Regulation D's Rule 506 places no limits on the offering amount.
17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015). Therefore, the GAO Report only used the Rule 506 offerings
that were for $5 million or less. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839,
SECURITIES REGULATION: FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS
(2012), supra note 29, at 10, 11 tbl.1.
59. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), supra note 29, at
9 fig.1.
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B. Why Regulation D's Rule 506 is the Preferred Choice
When comparing the Rule 506 requirements to Regulation A, it is
clear why Rule 506 has been the preferred choice.
OFFERING SIZE - Prior to the J.O.B.S. Act, Regulation A's offering
size was capped at $5 million;6 whereas under Rule 506, there is no
offering size limit. 6 1 Issuers can do an offering of any size, as long as the
Rule 506 requirements are met. But as highlighted earlier, issuers
overwhelmingly chose Rule 506 over Regulation D even where the
offering sizes were less than $5 million.62
DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS - Rule 506 has no disclosure
requirements for offerings made to accredited investors.63 However, the
rule does require that audited financial statements be furnished to investors
that are not accredited.64 Where disclosure is required, the depth and
breadth of financial disclosure required depends on the offering size.
Generally speaking, as the offering size gets bigger, the depth and breadth
of financial disclosure under Rule 506 increases.66  By comparison,
Regulation A requires the issuer to prepare and file the thirty-five page
Form 1-A regardless of whether the investors are accredited or not. In
this regard, the disclosure requirements for Rule 506 and Regulation A are
comparable. But the significant difference is that the Regulation A
exemption requires the issuer to file the offering statement with the SEC
and be subject to SEC review and qualification.68 Rule 506 merely requires
60. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) (specifying $5 million limit) (amended by 17 C.F.R.
pt. 230 (2015)).
61. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015). Whereas Rule 504 and 505 specify limits of $1 million
and $5 million respectively, Rule 506 does not state any dollar limit. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.504-
.506 (2015).
62. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), supra note 29, at
11 tbl.1.
63. Cf. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b)(1) (2015) (recommending that disclosures be made to
accredited investors to avoid running afoul of the anti-fraud provisions under both the '33
and '34 Acts.).
64. Id. at §230.502(b)(l)-(2).
65. See id. at § 230.502(b)(2)(ii)(B)(1) (requiring an audited balance sheet dated within
120 days from the issued date for offerings up to $2,000,000); see id. §
230.502(b)(2)(ii)(B)(2) (requiring additional disclosures such as audited financial statements
for a specified number of years for offerings up to $ 7,500,000). See id. § 230.502(b) (2015)
(listing the full complement of required disclosures).
66. See id. at § 230.502(b)(2)(ii)(B) (describing the disclosure requirements for
offerings of various sizes).
67. Id. at § 230.252(a).
68. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
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that the disclosure be made directly to the potential investors.69 This
difference is significant in that filing with the SEC results in an average
qualification period of 228 days for a Regulation A filing; whereas under
Rule 506 such a qualification process does not exist.70 Therefore there is
no wait time involved under a Rule 506 offering. The issuer can offer its
securities immediately under a Rule 506 offering.7 '
INVESTOR QUALIFICATIONS - Rule 506 has qualification criteria for its
potential investors. Investors must either be accredited, or
"sophisticated." 7 2 By "sophisticated" the Rule states explicitly, "[e]ach
purchaser who is not an accredited investor either alone or with his
purchaser representative(s) has such knowledge and experience in financial
and business matters that he is capable of evaluating the merits and risks of
the prospective investment. . . ."73 By comparison, Regulation A has no
qualifying criteria for its investors. Anyone can participate in a Regulation
A offering regardless of their net worth, income, or their financial
74
sophistication.
At first blush, the "no investor qualification requirement" under
Regulation A may appear to be an advantage and would add to Regulation
A's appeal, but a review of some forty-two Regulation A filings between
2008 and 2014 pointed toward a contrary conclusion.7 ' This study revealed
that even though the issuers were filing under Regulation A, their filing
documents indicated either a clear preference for investors that were either
accredited out right, or loosely met the accredited investor criteria. Six out
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), supra note 29, at
summary page What GAO Found.
69. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(b) (2015) (specifying the non-financial and financial
information to be disclosed to investors). No SEC filing requirement is stated in the
Regulation D except the requirement to file what is referred to as a Form D. 17 C.F.R. §
230.502(c)(2) (2015).
70. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), supra note 29, at
12.
71. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.502, .506 (2015). Rule 502 does require the issuer to file what is
called a Form D with the SEC. 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(2) (2015). But this is merely a
notice filing requirements and is not subject to an SEC review or qualification process. 17
C.F.R. § 230.502(c)(2) (2015).
72. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2015).
73. Id.
74. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-263 (2015) (placing no stipulations on the
investor's qualifications and, by inference, allowing anyone to invest in a Regulation A
offering regardless of net worth, income, or financial sophistication).
75. 42 Regulation A filings covering 2008-2014 were randomly selected. Each of the
42 filings selected are listed 1-42 in the Appendix: Part A with specific findings broken out
into categories in Appendix: Part B.
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of the forty-two Regulation A filings reviewed limited their pool of
potential investors to accredited investors only.76 Additionally, ten out of
the forty-two filings placed a minimum investment amount of $1,000 or
more. 77 Only nine out of the forty-two indicated a clear intent to solicit
investors publicly.7 ' And only three out of the forty-two filings indicated
that they were actively seeking investors without regard for the investor's
income, net worth, or financial sophistication. So, where one might
initially think Regulation A provides advantages with its more liberal
investor qualification criteria, as a practical matter the reality pans out quite
differently. The issue of investor qualifications will be explored in more
detail later in this paper.
C. The Onerous State Provisions
As briefly mentioned earlier, under Regulation D's Rule 506, the
issuer is exempt from any State Blue Sky registration requirements."
Specifically, this means that the issuer can forego all state registration or
filing requirements. By contrast, Regulation A requires registration in each
state where the issuer is going to be offering securities.8 ' This state
component adds significant effort on the issuer's part as the issuer must
research each state's individual registration requirements and then the
issuer must tailor its filing to comport with each state.
When looking at all that is required, it is clear why Regulation A
historically has not been the exemption of choice; too much required for
too little benefit. But Congress has concluded incorrectly that if it simply
makes some "tweaks" to Regulation A, the tweaks will make Regulation A
a more viable option and issuers will select the Regulation A exemption
with more frequency than what has occurred historically. But Regulation
76. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category I which lists the Regulation A filers that
limited their pool of investors to accredited investors only.
77. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 4 for a list of Regulation A filers stipulating at
least a $1,000 per investor minimum.
78. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 6 for a list of Regulation A filers who showed
a clear intent to solicit investor publicly.
79. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 7 for a list of Regulation A filers that clearly
indicated through a low per share purchase price and no investor criteria that their offering
was open to any interested investor.
80. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4)(E) (2012).
81. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-839, SECURITIES REGULATION:
FACTORS THAT MAY AFFECT TRENDS IN REGULATION A OFFERINGS (2012), supra note 29, at
13.
82. Spurring Job Growth Through Capital Formation While Protecting Investors-Part
1: Hearing Before the Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs, 112th Cong. 25-26
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A was a flawed exemption from its inception and any changes to it won't
be enough. The fact that there are other choices that do everything that
Regulation A does but with much less burden makes Regulation A a "non-
starter" even with the revisions that have been proposed under the J.O.B.S.
Act. 83  Those revisions will be discussed and analyzed in the following
section.
IV. THE J.O.B.S. ACT'S REGULATION A MODIFICATIONS
On March 25, 2015, after much political wrangling, the SEC, in a rare
act of defiance against state regulators, drafted final rules to amend
Regulation A.8 The highlights to the SEC's final Regulation A rules are as
follows:
A Two-TIERED OFFERING SYSTEM: In the SEC's final rules, it has
divided Regulation A offerings into two tiers: Tier 1 and Tier 2. Tier 1 is
for offerings up to $20 million.8 6  Tier 2 is for offerings between $20
million and $50 million.87  The SEC's final rules have different filing,
reporting, and disclosure requirements for each of the two tiers.
TIER 1 - Tier 1 relates to offerings up to $20 million." Under the Tier
1 Regulation A offering regime, the issuer's maximum offering amount can
be up to, but may not exceed, $20 million.89 Under the Tier I offering
regime, the investors need not have any special investor qualifications; 90
the investors can be both accredited and non-accredited investors and there
is no limit as to how much any one investor can invest.91 Under the Tier 1
(2011) (inquiry from Sen. Richard Shelby, Ranking Member, Comm. on Banking, Hous., &
Urban Affairs), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG- I 2shrg74738/html/CHRG-
112shrg74738.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/2G6S-JMU6. Legislative hearings
testimony suggests that simply raising the dollar limit on Regulation A and making other
modifications will fix what has been ailing the Regulation A exemption since its inception.
83. As discussed previously, Regulation D's Rule 506 has no dollar limit and the issuer
is preempted from state registration requirements. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015). See
generally 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012) (exempting under Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933
certain securities and securities offerings from state registration, but not exempting offerings
made under Regulation A (pre-J.O.B.S. Act)).
84. Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under the Securities Act
(Regulation A), 80 Fed. Reg. 21806 (Apr. 20, 2015) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 200,
230, 232, 239, 240, 249, and 260).
85. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a) (2015).
86. Id. at § 230.251(a)(1).
87. Id. at § 230.25 1(a)(2).
88. Id. at § 230.25 1(a)(1).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. (imposing no specific requirements for the investor's qualifications and no
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offering regime, the issuer can widely solicit investors, and the shares come
with no restrictions on resale.92
Under the Tier 1 regime, the issuer will be required to complete the
same qualification process as mentioned earlier with the filing of Form 1-
A.93 Consistent with the Regulation A requirements prior to the J.O.B.S.
Act, the Issuer need not include audited financial statements with the
filing.94  Likewise, the issuer will not be subject to ongoing periodic
financial disclosures or reporting requirements. 95 Under the Tier 1 offering
regime, the issuer will remain subject to state filing and registration
requirements.96 In sum, all Tier I offerings will be subject to the same
requirements that were in place prior to the J.O.B.S. Act. No changes were
made to the previous Regulation A provisions other than raising the cap
from $5 million to $20 million.
TIER 2 - Under the Tier 2 Regulation A offering regime, the issuer
can offer securities for amounts between $20 million and $50 million.98
Similar to Tier 1 investors, Tier 2 investors need not have any special
investor qualifications.99 But, non-accredited investors may not invest
more than 10% of either their annual gross income or 10% of their net
worth, whichever is greater.ioo Again, similar to Tier 1, Tier 2 issuers can
advertise for and solicit investors.' 0 '
The filing and reporting requirements, however, are much more
stringent for Tier 2 issuers. Under Tier 2, the issuer must include audited
financial statements with its Form 1-A offering statement. 0 2 Additionally,
limits on the amounts of investments).
92. Id. at § 230.255(a).
93. Id. at § 230.252(a).
94. Id.
95. Id. at § 230.257(a).
96. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (2012) (comparing Section 15 to Section 18 to show that
Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1933 generally does not exempt Regulation A offerings
from state registration and filing requirements).
97. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2015), with 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2014) (as amended by 17
C.F.R pt. 230 (2015)) (showing no changes other than the raising of the cap).
98. 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 1(a)(2) (2015).
99. See id. (containing no requirements for special investor qualifications).
100. Id. at § 230.251(d)(2)(i)(C).
101. Id. at § 230.255.
102. Regulation A Offering Statement under the Securities Act of 1933, Form I-A, 17
C.F.R. § 239.90 (2015) prescribes the informational filing and disclosure requirements for
Regulation A offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(a) (2015). See 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (requiriing
the use of Form I-A for Regulation A offerings); S.E.C., Form I-A - Regulation A
Offering Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, pt. F/S(c),
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formI-a.pdf, archived at https://perma.cclH6QP-GU3Q
(requiring audited financial statements for Tier 2 Regulation A offerings).
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the issuer must prepare and file annual, semi-annual, and current financial
reports with the SEC.os These reports must include audited financial
statements. 0 4  There is an important caveat to the ongoing financial
reporting requirement. The issuer's Tier 2 reporting obligations will be
suspended if the issuer has less than 300 shareholders.10 This suspension
applies only after the issuer completes all of its reporting obligations during
the year in which the SEC qualifies the offering statement.1 0 6 Finally and
most significantly, Tier 2 offerings are exempt from all state filing and
registration requirements .07
Not surprisingly, the NASAA, as a body comprised of state securities
regulators,1os was strongly opposed to state preemption. State preemption
divests state securities regulators involvement from all Tier 2 offerings.
Their general position is that, without the state registration requirement,
investors in their jurisdictions would be exposed to fraud and would be
taken advantage of.' 09 They also expressed the feeling that they, as state
regulators, were closer to any local situation and were therefore in a better
position to oversee securities offerings occurring within their borders."1 0
The legal fallout surrounding the SEC's final controversial Regulation A
rules will be discussed in depth in Section VI.
103. 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(b) (2015).
104. Id. at § 230.257(b)(2)(i)(A).
105. Id. at § 230.257(d)(2).
106. Id.
107. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (exempting sales of securities to "qualified purchasers," as
defined by SEC rules, from state regulation of securities offerings). Regulation A's final
rules broadly define "qualified purchaser" as "any person to whom securities are offered or
sold pursuant to a Tier 2 offering of this Regulation A." 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2015).
108. North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA) is an international
organization of security administrators devoted to investors protection. About us, N. AM.
SEC. ADM'RS Ass'N, http://www.nasaa.org/about-us/, archived at http://perma.cc/BS59-
KUBC (last visited Nov. 29, 2015). In the United States, NASAA is "the voice of state and
provincial securities regulators." Id. NASAA's jurisdiction extends to "a wide variety of
issuers and intermediaries who offer and sell securities to the public." Id.
109. See, e.g., Andrea Seidt, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, Inc., Comment Letter
in Response to the Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional Issues Exemptions
Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act at 10, 14 (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-75.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G3V4-
NP9J (arguing that maintaining state registration of Regulation A offerings will promote
investor protections by States as intended by Congress).
110. See, e.g., William M. Beatty, Sec. Adm'r, State of Wash., Dep't of Fin. Insts.,
Comment Letter in Response to the Proposed Rule Amendments for Small and Additional
Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act at 3 (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s7ll13-76.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E9MT-
T3B3. ("In light of the local nature of these offerings, state regulation of these offerings is
essential to investor protection and the facilitation of capital formation").
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V. BUT WILL THOSE MODIFICATIONS MAKE A DIFFERENCE?
But will Regulation A, even with its modifications that seek to strike a
compromise between capital seekers and state regulators, make the
Regulation A private offering exemption a more appealing alternative?
The answer is no. To support the "no" conclusion, the best approach is to
engage in a speculative exercise. The exercise posits why, in theory, an
issuer might choose Regulation A over another viable alternative and then
provides rebutting arguments against the position of choosing regulation A
over another viable position.
A. Why Regulation A (in theory)?
Theoretically speaking, when would an issuer choose Regulation A
(as modified) over some other exemption? If the issuer is being thoughtful
about the decision, it would choose Regulation A only when the Regulation
A exemption provides something or allows for something that other
exemptions do not. In that regard, Regulation A has two distinguishing
characteristics that are present both before and after its modifications under
the J.O.B.S. Act.
First, under Regulation A, the issuer can advertise for and publicly
solicit potential investors."' Thus, under Regulation A, the issuer can cast
a wider net when seeking potential investors. This theoretically allows the
issuer to draw from a bigger pool of potential investors and therefore
increases the likelihood that the issuer will raise the amount of equity it is
seeking from the offering.
Second, Regulation A has no investor qualification criteria." 2
Anyone, regardless of income, net worth, or financial knowledge and
sophistication, can participate in a Regulation A offering." 3 In theory, this
increases the pool of potential investors that can participate in the issuer's
offering. Also, the issuer can target and include selected individuals as
investors regardless of their net worth, income, or financial sophistication.
111. 17 C.F.R. § 230.255(a) (2015) ("At any time before the qualification of an offering
statement, including before the non-public submission or public filing of such offering
statement, an issuer or any person authorized to act on behalf of an issuer may communicate
orally or in writing to determine whether there is any interest in a contemplated securities
offering.").
112. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-263 (2015) (imposing no investor requirement
criteria). Typically when an offering exemption has investor qualifications or criteria, those
qualifications and criteria will be specified in the exemption. Regulation A, consisting of
Rules 251-263, makes no mention of investor qualifications or criteria.
113. Id.
2015] 83
84 U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW
Thus, a Regulation A offering allows the issuer to include a broader
investor pool, one that can include both sophisticated and unsophisticated
investors as well as both high- and low-net-worth individuals, whereas
under other exemptions, unsophisticated and low net worth investors would
be excluded such as under the Regulation D Rule 506 offering
114
exemption. These two distinguishing Regulation A characteristics may,
in some circumstances, make Regulation A the preferable choice, at least in
theory.
B. But Why Not Regulation A in Practice?
But in practice, these perceived Regulation A advantages do not seem
to be factors that an issuer considers when deciding to do a private offering
under Regulation A. Also, what may seem to be an advantage of being
able to draw from a larger pool of "lay investors," upon further
examination, is not advantageous at all and is not something that factors
heavily into an issuer's decision-making.
i. Regulation A Filers Still Sought Out High Net Worth and High
Income Individuals
First off, Title II of the J.O.B.S. Act changed the solicitation rules."5
Now, under added Regulation D Rule 506(c), issuers can solicit and
advertise for investors with the caveat that actual investors must be
accredited."'6 Prior to the J.O.B.S. Act, soliciting investors for a Regulation
D Rule 506 offering was prohibited."'7 By contrast, Regulation A allows
for both public solicitation and places no stipulations on the investor's
qualifications.' While this is a very real difference in theory, in practice,
114. Id. at § 230.506(b)(2)(ii).
115. Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (J.O.B.S. Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, §
201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15
U.S.C.) (directing SEC to revise solicitation rules applicable to offers and sales pursuant
Rule 506).
116. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2015). Rule 506(c) was added pursuant to the J.O.B.S.
Act's Title II. J.O.B.S. Act § 201(a)(1).
117. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2015) (effective Sept. 15, 2008 to Mar. 27, 2012)
(amended by Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (J.O.B.S. Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, §
201(a)(1), 126 Stat. 306, 313 (2012)) (preventing promotion unless allowed under §
230.504(b)(1) or § 230.506(c)), with 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2013) (Pre-J.O.B.S. Act
version, not providing an exception for promotion under the Rule 506(c) provision, which
provision allows advertising and solicitation as long as the actual investors are accredited).
118. See 17 C.F.R. § 255(a) (2015) (allowing for public solicitation); 17 C.F.R. §
230.251(a) (2015) (imposing no specific requirements for the investor's qualifications and
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this perceived Regulation A advantage does not manifest itself in any
meaningful way.
The above conclusion is based on a review of forty-two Regulation A
filings covering the period from 2008 to 2014."9 The research found that
the perceived advantages related to the more liberal Regulation A public
solicitation rules, and the opportunity to cast a wider net to include both
accredited and "lay investors," did not bear itself out in practice. In fact,
researching these forty-two filings showed that a large majority of the
Regulation A filings (some twenty-four percent) likely could have been
filed and were perhaps better suited to be filed under a less cumbersome,
less expensive, and less time-consuming exemption other than the
Regulation A exemption that the issuer chose.120
For example, out of the forty-two filings reviewed, six issuers
explicitly limited their investor pool to accredited investors (i.e. investors
with a net worth greater than $1 million or income in excess of $200,000 in
each of the two most recent years) and four issuers limited their investor
pool to financially savvy investors. 2 ' Accordingly, in these instances,
whatever benefits that could have been derived from filing under
Regulation A such as being open to all investors regardless of income, net
worth, or financial sophistication, was negated by the stipulation that the
investors either be accredited or be financially savvy; i.e. the requirements
22for the more often used Rule 506 exemption.
Additionally, at least ten of the filings stipulated that any participating
investor had to invest a minimum of $1,000 with one issuer placing a
23
minimum investment at $249,750. Though not an incredibly large
amount, the investor minimum again cuts against the grain of being
available and open to all investors regardless of income or net worth.
Setting a minimum investment amount at $1,000 is still a cap of some
significance in that it prevents any "layperson" who does not have at least
$1,000 of disposable income available from participating in the offering.
no limits on the amounts of investments).
119. See infra Appendix: Part A for the list of forty-two Regulation A filings selected
randomly over this period.
120. The twenty-four percent calculation is based on the six Regulation A filings noted
infra in Appendix: Part B, Category 1(accredited investors), and Category 2 (sophisticated
investors). The investor must meet one of these two criteria to be a qualified investor under
Regulation D's Rule 506. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (describing the required
expertise when a purchaser is unaccredited).
121. See infra Appendix: Part B, Categories I and 2 for a corresponding explanation.
122. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506 (2015).
123. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 4 which lists the issuers that required an
investor minimum of $1,000.
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Many in the general population do not have $1,000 or more at their
disposal to invest. Placing an investment minimum suggests that the
issuers are discriminating somewhat as to the type of investor they are
targeting for their offering; yet another aspect that is contrary to what one
would expect from Regulation A filers.
ii. Very Few Regulation A Filers Took Advantage of the More
Liberal Public Advertising and Solicitation Rules
Recall that Regulation A allows the issuer to publicly solicit
investors.124 Publicly soliciting investors is a practice that was previously
prohibited under Regulation D's Rule 506.125 Thus, if one were being
thoughtful about using Regulation A, then you would expect the issuer
filing under Regulation A to take advantage of this aspect and cast his net
as widely as possible. But only nine filings out of the forty-two stated that
their "Plan of Distribution" would involve publicly soliciting investors.126
In sum, in the vast majority of the Regulation A filings reviewed,
there were perhaps only three issuers that clearly filed under Regulation A
because of the distinguishing aspects that Regulation A affords; namely,
the ability to publicly solicit investors and the ability to include any and all
potential investors regardless of net worth, income, or financial
sophistication. All the other Regulation A filers were structured such that
they could have filed under Rule 506 and were perhaps better suited for
Rule 506 but for some unclear reason they chose the more cumbersome
Regulation A path. In the interest of full disclosure, there were at least ten
Regulation A filings that were prepared without counsel's assistance.1 2 7
This conclusion was based on the fact that these filings noted either "n/a"
or "none" (or some similar indication) where the issuer is asked to indicate
whether counsel prepared or assisted in preparing the filing. 128  It is
plausible to conclude that these "lay filers" may not have been as familiar
with the rules surrounding exempt offerings and the different options each
exemption provides. Thus, it is possible that these "lay filers" may have
124. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.255 (2015) (describing the requirements that apply when
securities are offered in a circular).
125. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.502(c) (2013) (Pre-J.O.B.S. Act version of statute, not
providing an exception for promotion under the Rule 506(c) provision, which provision
allows advertising and solicitation as long as the actual investors are accredited).
126. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 6 for a list of companies giving a clear intent
to solicit investors publicly.
127. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 5 for list of issuers who prepared their
Regulation A filing without counsel's assistance.
128. Id.
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chosen an exemption other than Regulation A if they were better informed
or had more knowledge about the available choices.
iii. Lay Investors and Low Net Worth or Low Income Individuals
Do Not Apply
The takeaway from all of this is clear. Even in the case of the
Regulation A filers, issuers seemed to prefer investors that had obtained at
least some degree of "financial substance,"1 29 either through an
accumulated mass of wealth, from earning a solid income, or by otherwise
being financially savvy. 30 The reasoning behind this preference is clear, is
understandable, and further drives home the point that just because an
issuer is able to cast a wider investment net does not mean that it is prudent
to do so. Investors who do not have a critical mass of net worth or do not
earn an income that allows for a fair amount of disposable income make for
a less stable investor pool.
First off, low net worth or low income investors are more likely to be
investing money that they can ill afford to lose. Second, investors of this
type tend to be a cumbersome lot for the issuer because: (1) they may have
a disproportionate amount of money invested in the venture relative to their
overall net worth; and (2) they are more likely to be unfamiliar with the
speculative nature of investing and the true risks involved. In these
instances, the issuer can expect this investor type to be burdensome. It is
foreseeable that these unsophisticated investors will make frequent
inquiries into how much and when they will get their money back. They
may frequently need and require a lot of handholding in terms of
explaining what is going on; especially if the issuer's business takes a
downturn. In sum, investors of this nature can and often are more trouble
than they are worth. Thus, if an issuer finds itself in the situation where
Regulation A is the only viable option due to the nature of its potential
investor pool, then the issuer should reassess whether it should be doing a
private securities offering at all.
This discussion drives home the point as to Regulation A's limited
use. If, in fact, it were the case that your investor pool was neither wealthy
nor sophisticated, then you have a tenuous investor pool at best. For these
reasons, even where issuers were filing under Regulation A, they
nonetheless structured their offerings such that "lay investors" would be
129. See infra Appendix: Part B, Categories 1-5 for list of companies that placed SOME
kind of investor qualification, or criteria as a pre-cursor to investing - whether that be
financial sophistication, income or net worth minimums or a minimum investment amount.
130. Id.
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excluded, and in many cases, the issuer specifically targeted accredited
investors to the exclusion of all others.13 ' The end result is, although the
issuer filed under Regulation A, those filings more often than not could
have been filed under another less cumbersome exemption such as
Regulation D's Rule 506.
Why issuers chose to file under Regulation A in spite of not making
use of Regulation A's distinguishing characteristics is not clear. The likely
reason is that the issuer simply did not have a full grasp of all the exempt
offering choices and the distinguishing characteristics of each. Again, it is
believed that a lot of these choices to file under Regulation A were done
without counsel's assistance or were otherwise ill-advised.
C. How will the J.O.B.S. Act Modifications Affect the Regulation A
Decision?
In spite of all the political wrangling and the SEC's efforts to appease
state regulators, the Regulation A end product has resulted in offering
exemptions that are still deficient and still fail to consider the end user.
Tier I contains all of the same onerous provisions that existed prior to the
J.O.B.S. Act's revisions, and the Tier 2 regime adds a layer of financial
disclosure and reporting requirements that rivals publicly held company
disclosures. 32 Therefore, both the Tier 1 and Tier 2 offering regimes are
still weighed down with onerous requirements that will cause most
potential issuers to choose other options.
TIER I (for offerings up to $20 million) - In essence, the Tier I
requirements are exactly the same as they were prior to the J.O.B.S. Act
with the exception that the offering cap has been raised from $5 million to
$20 million.' Other than that, the exemption is exactly the same as the
pre-J.O.B.S. Act version.134 Under the Tier I requirements, the Regulation
131. See infra Appendix: Part B, Category 1 for list of Regulation A filers that limited its
investor pool to accredited investors as defined under Regulation D, Rule 506. See 17
C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (outlining the requirements for an unaccredited investor).
132. See Form 1-A, 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (2015), https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forml-
a.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/H6QP-GU3Q (providing the instructions and form
related to the offering statement); 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-252, .257 (2015) (outlining the
conditions that, when fulfilled, remove the need to register, and providing the requirements
of an offering statement and sales report).
133. Compare 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 1(a)(1) (2015) (limiting Tier 1 prices to a maximum of
$20 million), with 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) (limiting exemption amount to a
maximum of $5 million).
134. Compare 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(a)(1),.252,.257 (2015), with 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-
.252, .257 (2014) (effective to June 18, 2015) (amended by 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2015)) (stating
identical requirements for registration, offering statements, and sales reports).
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A aspects that made it undesirable prior to its modifications under the
J.O.B.S. Act are still present; namely the lack of state preemption which
therefore necessitates the need for the issuer to comport with filing and
registration requirements in each jurisdiction in which the issuer is offering
securities.
The Tier I offering regime structured as it is will result in Regulation
A remaining in its current state of dormancy because the large majority of
potential Regulation A issuers would be the ones whose offerings' sizes
would be for $20 million or less. This is because if the issuer were to offer
securities for larger amounts, then more than likely the issuer would be of a
size and sophistication where they would choose more desirable and less
cumbersome exemptions such as Regulation D's Rule 506.
Again, this conclusion is based on our review of some forty-two
Regulation A Filings between 2008 and 2014. Those filings revealed
issuers, a majority of whom were lacking in sophistication, as evidenced by
the deficient manner in which their Form 1-A offering statements were
completed.135 That, coupled with the very low qualification rate mentioned
earlier, suggests that the problems with Regulation A prior to the J.O.B.S.
Act will persist as the modifications did not address those problems in any
meaningful way, if at all.
TIER 2 - Similarly, with the Tier 2 offering regime, the costs to
comply still outweigh the corresponding benefits, even with the offering
limit raised to $50 million.' This is primarily because once an issuer's
infrastructure has reached a size where it is in a position to raise up to $50
million, there are alternatives (again Regulation D's Rule 506) that work
much better for the issuer than Regulation A and are much less
cumbersome.
As discussed earlier, under the Tier 2 offering regime, the issuer must
provide audited financial statements in its filing' and must also provide
audited financial statements on an annual basis."' Accordingly, any issuer
choosing to offer securities under Regulation A's Tier 2 regime would have
to be a company that has reached a critical mass in terms of size and
infrastructure to absorb the costs involved with providing audited financial
statements in its filing along with providing annual audited financial
statements going forward on an ongoing basis. Looking again to the pool
of potential investors, there could be a number of possible scenarios.
135. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (outlining the characteristics needed when an
investor is unaccredited).
136. 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(a)(2) (2015).
137. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.252(a), 239.90 (2015).
138. 17 C.F.R. § 230.257(b) (2015).
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Again, the only one where Regulation A is the superior choice over other
options is the scenario where a significant portion, at least a majority, of the
issuer's potential investor pool is "lay investors." Otherwise one of the
other exemptions (namely Regulation D's Rule 506) would make for a
more logical choice. If this is in fact the case, then it is reasonable to
conclude that no individual investor would have a large amount of money
to invest because if they did, they would more than likely meet the
accredited investor criteria. Your pool of investors would therefore be a
considerably large number of "lay investors" with each investor
contributing a nominal amount to the total offering.
Though this scenario in theory is possible, again, it is not likely.
Individuals with little or no disposable income are few and far between in
the realm of private placements. The only clear advantage that Regulation
A would have over other options would be to tap into this nearly non-
existent pool of "lay investors"; an investment pool that is neither viable,
desirable, nor prevalent enough to warrant choosing an exemption
specifically tailored for their participation. None of these dynamics would
change under the modified Regulation A's two tiered offering regime.
Regulation A simply does not reconcile to the realities of the market place.
VI. THE STATE PREEMPTION CONTROVERSY
Further weighing Regulation A down and bolstering the argument for
its obsolescence are the current and pending controversies surrounding the
Commission's state preemption decision for Tier 2 offerings. As discussed
earlier, Regulation A, before its revisions under the J.O.B.S. Act, did not
allow for state preemption.'3  Pre J.O.B.S. Act, an issuer had to satisfy the
registration requirements in each jurisdiction in which the issuer was
offering its securities.1 4 0 Let's appreciate the added regulatory burden that
this posed by using a real life Regulation A filing as an example.
Godspell LLC is a limited liability company that filed under
Regulation A in February of 2010 (pre J.O.B.S. Act). 1 4 ' According to its
139. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (2012) (not including Regulation A offerings among
offerings that are exempt from state registration and filing requirements).
140. See U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-12-839, Securities Regulation: Factors
That May Affect Trends in Regulation A Offerings 8 (2012) (describing how pre-sale
registration of an offering is required under state law). Again, this was required because
there was no state preemption under the federal securities law for Regulation A offerings.
See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(4) (2012) (excluding Regulation A offerings from available
exemptions).
141. The Godspell LLC, Regulation A Offering Statement Under the Securities Act of
1933 (Form 1-A) (Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/vprr/10/9999999997-
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Form I-A offering Circular as of 1/31/2010, Godspell had total assets of
$100 and no liabilities. 4 2 According to its filing documents, Godspell LLC
was planning on offering securities in California, Connecticut, Illinois,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York.
Accordingly, in addition to filing its Form 1-A at the federal level,
Godspell LLC then had to research and comply with each of the
registration requirements in California, Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, and New York respectively. 44
These added burdens required additional layers of expense, company
resources, and perhaps the most precious commodity of all-time. Pre
J.O.B.S. Act, choosing a different exemption meant avoiding all of these
registration and compliance hurdles. Because of this, many issuers
assessed all that would be involved in doing a Regulation A filing and then
ultimately chose to go in a different direction because the cost to comply
far outweighed the benefits. The historically low use of Regulation A
corroborates this conclusion. 45
As discussed earlier, the Commission's final rules did in fact preempt
state filing requirements for all Tier 2 offerings (i.e. amounts between $20
million and $50 million).1 46  But, as expected, state regulators in two
jurisdictions have filed suit in reaction to the state preemption decision for
Tier 2 offerings, and there are likely to be additional suits to follow.1 4 7 The
legal challenges to Regulation A will be discussed in Part B of this
section.148 Accordingly, the fight and the arguments loom, casting a long
shadow over those who might choose to venture down the now murky
Regulation A path.1 4 9
10-001230, archived at https://perma.cc/LE2T-3PXA.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 50.
145. U.S. Gov't Accountability Office, GAO-12-839, Securities Regulation: Factors
That May Affect Trends in Regulation A Offerings (2012), at 9, Figure 1. The Report
conveys Regulation A's declining use which peaked at 116 filings in 1997 and has declined
steadily through 2011 where there were only 19 Regulation A filings in 2011.
146. Under 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) sales of securities to "qualified purchasers," as defined
by SEC rules, are exempt from state regulation of securities offerings. 15 U.S.C.
§77r(b)(3)(2012). Regulation A's final rules broadly define "qualified purchaser" as "any
person to whom securities are offered or sold pursuant to a Tier 2 offering." 17 C.F.R. §
230.256 (2015).
147. Lindeen v. SEC, No. 15-1149 (D.C. Cir. filed May 22, 2015) and Galvin v. S.E.C.,
No. 15-1150 (D.C. Cir. filed May 22, 2015) (cases consolidated May 27, 2015).
148. See supra Part IV-B (discussing the legal challenges to Regulation A).
149. See 17 C.F.R. § 230 (2015) (detailing the stipulations of Regulation A).
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A. The General Arguments Against State Preemption
Opposition against state preemption, not surprisingly, is strongest with
the state regulators, those entities that would be undertaking the task of
approving the application for any company seeking to issue securities in
that particular jurisdiction. The arguments from those opposing state
preemption essentially boil down to positions such as: "[state preemption]
would handicap the states from providing oversight . .. at a time when the
Commission lacks the resources to police this area."5 o "Regulation A
securities can be high-risk offerings that may also be susceptible to fraud,
making protections provided by the State regulators an essential
[feature]."'"' "State regulators are more accountable to local investors and
businesses and have the ability to respond quickly to fraudulent offerings
occurring in their own backyards." 52
These arguments are valid, quite valid in fact, but there is a major flaw
in their reasoning. These opposing voices fail to consider the issue in its
broader context. Yes, it is reasonable to conclude that an additional state
regulatory component would likely result in fewer instances of investors
being defrauded. But to what end? When you read the comment letters
from the state regulators, they do make compelling arguments in projecting
dire outcomes for investors if they (the state regulators) are not allowed to
inject themselves into the registration process to champion the small
investors' cause. But without exception, what is glaringly absent from all
of their recriminations is the effect that the state registration requirement
will have on Regulation A's actual use. That part of the argument is absent
from their protests. It is absent because if these state regulators included or
even considered the practical side of the argument, they would have to
concede that the state registration requirement bogs down an already overly
burdened private offering exemption. Nonetheless, the Commission has
acquiesced somewhat to their pleas by keeping the state filing requirements
150. Comment Letter from William M. Beatty, Sec. Adm'r, State of Wash., Dep't of Fin.
Insts. Sec. Div., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, at I (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s7ll13-76.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E9MT-
T3B3.
151. Comment Letter from William M. Beatty, Sec. Adm'r, State of Wash., Dep't of Fin.
Insts. Sec. Div., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, at 2 (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7- 11-13/s7ll13-76.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E9MT-
T3B3 (quoting 157 Cong. Rec. H7, 229-01(daily ed. Nov. 2, 2011) (statement of Rep.
Peters)).
152. Comment Letter from William M. Beatty, Sec. Adm'r, State of Wash., Dep't of Fin.
Insts. Sec. Div., to Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, at 4 (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-1 l-13/s7ll13-76.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/E9MT-
T3B3.
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for Tier I offerings which, as discussed earlier, is a mistake.
Additionally, proponents for the state registration requirement will
point to Regulation D Rule 506 and the apparent high incidents of investor
fraud as another argument as to why Regulation A should not be similarly
exposed.153 In response to that argument, all laws have their limits. It is
hard to legislate people into doing the right thing. Laws designed to protect
investors, just like all other laws, have to strike a balance between (in this
case) protecting investors while creating a regulatory regime that is worthy
from a cost-benefit standpoint. To their credit, at least with respect to
Regulation A's Tier 2 offerings, the Commission decided to take a stand in
defiance of the state regulators.
B. State Preemption and the Question of Legality
Although the SEC has made its final decision regarding state
preemption, early signs indicate that State regulators plan to fight the SEC
through the courts on the state preemption issue. William F. Galvin, the
secretary of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, has joined Monica
Lindeen, Montana State Auditor ex officio Montana Commissioner of
Securities and Insurance, to consolidate their suit; they have filed a
Petitioners' Preliminary Statement of Issues against the SEC, contesting
state preemption's legality in the absence of what they feel is the express
statutory and legal authority to do so.154
The Preliminary Statement of Issues sets out 4 key issues or questions
for the court to address.
1. Whether the Commission's adoption of the rule-which
defines "qualified purchaser" to mean "any person to whom
securities are offered or sold pursuant to a Tier 2 offering under
Regulation A-is arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion,
or otherwise is unlawful because it conflicts with the plain
language of Title IV of the J.O.B.S. Act and Section 18(b)(3) of
the Securities Act ....
153. See Informed Investor Advisory: Private Placement Offerings-Are You an
Informed Investor?, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, http://www.nasaa.orgl22284/informed-
investor-alert-private-placement-offerings/, archived at http://perma.cc/C72Y-E6Y2 (last
updated Sept. 2013) (detailing what an investor should know about Regulation D, Rule 506,
including that fraud is more likely for Regulation D offerings because of the lack of
regulatory review).
154. Petitioners' Joint Preliminary Statement of Issues, Lindeen v. S.E.C., No. 15-1149
(D.C. Cir. filed May 22, 2015) (consolidated with Galvin v. S.E.C., No. 15-1150 (D.C. Cir.
filed May 22, 2015)).
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2. Whether the Commission Violated Sections 2(b), 3(b)(2)(G),
and 18(b)(3) of the Securities Act and Section 3(f) of the
Securities Exchange Act by preempting state registration and
qualification laws in a manner that is inconsistent with the public
interest and the protection of investors.
3.Whether the Commission violated § 2(b) of the Securities Act
and Section 3(f) of the Securities Exchange Act by failing to
adequately consider the protection of investors and the public
interest, among other factors, prior to its adoption of the rule.
4.Whether the Commission otherwise acted in a manner that is
arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
unlawful within the meaning of the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701 et seq., or other applicable law in adopting
its amendments and revisions to Regulation A's exemption from
state registration and qualification laws under the Securities
Act.155
As of the date of this writing, the suit was still in its pleading stages,
so the regulators' respective arguments were unavailable prior to this
article's publishing. The suit, however, is likely to follow the arguments
the NASAA put forth when Regulation A's final rules were still pending
and the Commission was still inviting comment letters on the proposed
156
rules.
The NASAA's argument gets its traction from the 1933 Act's Section
18." Section 18 says that state law shall not govern "covered
securities."" 8 Section 18 goes on further to define a "covered security" as
(among other things) "sales to qualified purchasers." 59 Section 18 gives
the Commission the authority to define a "qualified purchaser" with the
stipulation that any definition must be "consistent with the public interest
and the protection of investors."1
The Commission has used its rulemaking authority granted under
Section 18 to define a "qualified purchaser" simply as one who invests in a
155. Id. at 2-3.
156. Comment Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, Inc., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, at 2-4 (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-75.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G3V4-
NP9J.
157. 15 U.S.C. § 77r (2012) (Exemption From State Securities Regulation Offerings).
158. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77r(a)(1), (2) (2012).
159. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3) (2012).
160. Id.
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Tier 2 Regulation A offering.16' The NASAA, in its comment letter to the
Commission, attacked this definition as it applies to Regulation A, noting
that an investor in a Tier 2 Regulation A offering should not be defined as a
"qualified purchaser." 62 They argue that to do so would be inconsistent
with the public interest and the protection of investors. 6 3
Unlike Regulation D's Rule 506, Regulation A does not place any
restrictions on who can invest in a Regulation A offering. Under Rule 506,
investors are restricted to investors who are either accredited or have
"knowledge and experience in financial and business matters that [they
are] capable of evaluating the merits and risks of the prospective
investment. . . ." '6, while anyone can invest in a Regulation A offering
regardless of accredited investor status or investor sophistication.'6 5 The
NASAA's argument then is simply that defining a Regulation A offeree as
a "qualified purchaser" would be misplaced and inappropriate because the
potential Regulation A investor could be one who lacks the financial
acumen and sophistication to fend for himself.'6 6  It is likely that any
lawsuits filed opposing the Commissions' definition of "qualified
purchaser" will have arguments similar to the NASAA's.
The NASAA's argument has merit. As Regulation A is written, the
Regulation A investor could be an individual with no financial
sophistication whatsoever.167 The NASAA and the state regulators in its
association believe this issue is clear cut and unequivocal, but the matter
contains much more nuance where reasonable minds could differ.
The legality of defining a Regulation A investor as a "qualified
purchaser" is a matter of judgment, and yes, a matter of statutory
interpretation as to whether the Commission is over stepping its rulemaking
authority granted under Section 18. Section 18 clearly states that the
Commission has the authority to define a "qualified purchaser" but requires
the Commission's definition to be "consistent with the public interest and
161. 17 C.F.R. § 230.256 (2015).
162. Comment Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, Inc., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, at 2-4 (Mar. 24, 2014),
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-11-13/s71113-75.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G3V4-
NP9J.
163. Id. at 2 (emphasis added).
164. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(b)(2)(ii) (2015).
165. Again, a review of Regulation A reveals no stated qualification criteria for its
investors.
166. Comment Letter from Andrea Seidt, President, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, Inc., to
Elizabeth M. Murphy, Sec'y, SEC, at 8 (Mar. 24, 2014), http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-
11-13/s7113-75.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/G3V4-NP9J.
167. See generally 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251-.263 (2015) (stipulating the general
requirements of an investor under Regulation A).
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the protection of investors."I68 To conclude that the Commission is
overreaching in this case, the fact finder must conclude that defining a
"qualified purchaser" as one who invests in an exempt offering under
Regulation A is inconsistent with the public interest and the protection of
investors. How is such a determination made? This assessment is based
strictly on the rule maker's (the SEC in this case) judgment.
Rulemaking can never be stated in absolutes. A good rule is one that
is written with feasibility and practicality considerations. What good is an
exemption that provides the ultimate investor protection but is too
burdensome and cost prohibitive to be a viable alternative? Accordingly,
both feasibility and practicality considerations should be scrutinized when
analyzing the government's intent behind Regulation A. To define
Regulation A's Tier 2 offerees and investors as "qualified purchasers"
would be the Commission making the same practical considerations as it
did when it drafted some aspects of Regulation D. Very few rules can be
written with absolutes. The drafter almost always has to make some
concessions for practical considerations and (in this case) the rule must
strike the right balance between protecting investors and keeping the
exemption as one that remains viable from a cost-benefit standpoint.
The following example illustrates how concessions are made during
the drafting process. In drafting Regulation D, the Commission made some
concessions in deference to practical considerations that can result in
certain investors participating in a Rule 506 offering who, in actuality, are
persons who probably should not be participants in such offerings. Take
for example the "accredited investor" definitions under Regulation D.169
Under the Rule, you qualify as an accredited investor if your net worth
exceeds $1,000,000.17o By this definition, a hypothetical John Doe, who
has never allocated one penny of his earnings towards investing or saving,
and who might not know a prospectus from a marketing brochure could
qualify as an accredited investor if his winning lottery ticket put his net
worth over the one million dollar mark. His million plus winnings could
go to a private venture of his choosing and the law would define him as an
accredited investor; one for whom no special considerations, protections, or
disclosures would be required. Here, with Regulation D, the Commission
chose the route of defining "accredited investor" in terms of bright line
quantifiable metrics for practical considerations. The bright line definitions
give issuers seeking to use the Regulation clear and unequivocal guidance
168. 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b)(3)(2012).
169. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(2015) (giving various definitions of those persons and
entities that fall under the accredited investor definition).
170. 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5) (2015).
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on who falls within the definition. This concession was done for reasons of
efficiency and practicality, in spite of the fact that some investors may fall
through its fissures. Further, Section 2(b) of the Securities Act of 1933
mandates that rules must also take into consideration matters such as
practical considerations that facilitate the formation of capital.'
The same practical considerations and judgments need to come into
play with the Commission and its Regulation A rulemaking. Yes, it is
possible (and likely) that defining a "qualified purchaser" as being a Tier 2
Regulation A investor would result in some investors who shouldn't be in
that space. But the rule should be drafted with practical considerations in
mind as well. Additionally, as discussed earlier, issuers will be self-
selecting. Regulation A filers will more than likely seek out either
accredited or sophisticated investors and will leave the unenlightened
alone.
Additionally, in the proposed rule itself, the Commission also believes
that, "substantial investor protections embedded in the issuer eligibility
conditions, limitations on investment, disclosure requirements,
qualification process and ongoing reporting requirements . . . could address
potential concerns that may arise as a result of the preemption of state
securities law registration and qualification requirements." 72 Also let's not
lose sight of the fact that the provisions of Section 12(a)(2) apply so the
investor will always have legal remedies under the law available after the
fact. Some may say prevention before the harm occurs is better than
trying to remedy a harm after the fact.
Again I respond with the mantra that practical considerations
necessitate some acquiescence and compromise in the rulemaking. In this
case, foregoing the state registration requirement for Tier 2 issuers is one of
those practical considerations and the legality of such action should be
upheld. That is if Regulation A has any chance of being viable at all.
In sum, given the uncertainty, and the pending and future litigation
171. 15 U.S.C. § 77b (2012) ("Whenever pursuant to this subchapter the Commission is
engaged in rulemaking and is required to consider or determine whether an action is
necessary or appropriate in the public interest, the Commission shall also consider, in
addition to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency,
competition, and capital formation.").
172. Small and Additional Issues Exemptions Under Section 3(b) of the Securities Act,
79 Fed. Reg. 3926, 3969 (proposed Jan. 23, 2014) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 230),
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2014-01-23/pdf/2013-30508.pdf, archived at
http://perma.cc/EGF3-NL3Y.
173. Section 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 grants relief to investors who can
show that the prospectus contained a misstatement or an omission if the misstatement or
omission were material in nature. 15 U.S.C. § 771(a)(2) (2012). Section 12(a)(2) essentially
grants the relief of refunding the investors' money. Id.
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that is looming over the Commission's final Regulation A rules, these
aspects are additional deterrents to using the Regulation A exemption. The
last thing a small business needs is a potential lawsuit related to its exempt
securities offering.
C. The State's Response: A Streamlined Protocol for Regulation A
Filings
To the State's credit, they have made efforts to streamline the state
filing and registration requirements. On March 11, 2014, the North
American Securities Administration Association announced that its
members voted to approve what they describe as a coordinated and more
streamlined filing and registration process. 74 The NASAA describes its
new "streamlined" review program as follows:
NASAA has developed streamlined multi-state review protocols for
Regulation A and Regulation A+ offerings to ease regulatory compliance
costs on small companies seeking to raise capital. Through this program,
launched in May 2014, Regulation A filings are made in one place and
distributed electronically to all states. Lead examiners will be appointed as
the primary point of contact for a filer and each state will be given 10
business days for review. The lead examiners alone will interact with the
issuer to resolve any deficiencies. 7 5
The new Coordinated Review Program (CRP or Program) is to work
as follows. On day one, issuers desiring to avail themselves to this
Program will e-mail an electronic copy of its Regulation A filing (the
issuer's Form I-A) along with all accompanying exhibits and such to the
State of Washington who will act as the program coordinator.17 6  The
program coordinator will then distribute these documents to all the states in
which the issuer has selected in its application materials. 7 7 Within three
business days after receiving the application materials, the program
coordinator is required to select both a disclosure examiner and a lead
examiner (assuming registration is sought in both types of jurisdictions).
Ten days after the program coordinator selects the lead examiners, the lead
174. N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, NASAA Members Approve Streamlined Multistate
Coordinated Review Program (Mar. 11, 2014), http://www.nasaa.org/29699/nasaa-
members-approve-streamlined-multi-state-coordinated-review-program/, archived at
http://perma.cc/3N7E-KHNP.
175. NASAA Multi-state Coordinated Review Program, N. Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n,
http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Coordinated-Review-Chart.pdf, archived
at http://perma.cc/5EW3-Y224 (last visited Nov. 29, 2015).
176. Id.
177. Id.
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examiners are required to draft and circulate a proposed comment letter to
all the other disclosure and merit states in which the issuer is seeking
171
registration for its offering.
To be clear of what is implied here, the lead examiners have ten days
to review the Regulation A filing and prepare a comment letter on
issues/deficiencies that the lead examiner surfaces through its review. The
lead examiners are then required to circulate that comment letter to all the
other participating jurisdictions. Those states then have five additional
business days in which to communicate any concerns or comments to the
lead examiners. Within three additional business days, the lead examiner
is required to make any necessary revisions and then send this initial
comment letter to the issuer. "If there are no deficiencies in the
application, no comments will be necessary and the registration will be
cleared by the lead examiners within 21 business days after it is filed."so
"If there are deficiencies, the lead examiners will communicate with
the applicant and the participating jurisdictions to resolve deficiencies.
Whenever an issuer files a response to any deficiency, the lead examiners
will reply within five business days."'8 ' And this process presumably will
repeat itself until the issuer has cleared all the cited deficiencies.
The NASAA states that the new Coordinated Review Program will
take a MINIMUM of thirty days. 82 But in looking at the process, in all
likelihood it will take much longer than that in most if not all the cases. As
discussed and noted earlier, a fair number of these Regulation A filings are
prepared without the assistance of counsel. These "issuer prepared filings"
are woefully deficient in both their breadth of disclosure and their
propriety. It's hard to speculate how long it would actually take to clear the
deficiencies with these filings. But if you take the number of Regulation A
filings that the SEC qualified between 2008 and 2011 as a basis for
comparison, it is reasonable to conclude that the number would be small.'
Further, if one has had occasion to prepare a Form 1-A, you would
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Application for Coordinated Review of Regulation A Offering-Form CR-3(b), N.
Am. Sec. Adm'rs Ass'n, http://www.nasaa.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/Coordinated-
Review-Application-Sec-3b.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZMX4-XYQL (last visited
Nov. 29, 2015).
183. Between 2008 and 2011, the Commission qualified 18 total Regulation A offerings.
By comparison, 1289 Registered Public Offerings were filed during that same time period.
U.S. Gov't Accountability Office (GAO), Securities Regulation: Factors That May Affect
Trends in Regulation A Offerings 11 (July, 2012), supra note 29.
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appreciate the voluminous amount of information the issuer is required to
furnish. The form alone is twenty-nine pages long before any information
is provided. 84 Depending on how exacting the state regulators decide to
be, in all likelihood, it could take up to several months to get all the
deficiencies cleared. Also, the issuer would be addressing these state level
concerns on a parallel track with the Regulation A filing that it completed
at the federal level.
In fairness to the state regulators and their proposed program, it will
not be known how long the process will actually take unless and until the
program is fully implemented and up and running. Regardless of how
streamlined the state registration process becomes as a result of the
NASAA's changes, with a state component remaining as part of the
process, that process will require additional time, effort, and expense from
the issuer.
In sum, the NASAA's efforts to streamline the process are
commendable. But if the SEC's final rules are somehow overturned for
Tier 2 offerings, such a ruling would be yet another anchor weighing down
an already encumbered exemption to the point where potential users (who
are thoughtful about the decision) will seek a different and less
cumbersome exemption. If Regulation A is to have any issuer appeal and
resurgence at all, the final rule that preempts tier 2 offerings from state
registration must stand.
VII. FOR ARGUMENT'S SAKE
Although I hold firm to the conclusion that Congress should have let
Regulation A lie and no attempt should have been made to revive it, the
scholarly endeavor is incomplete if no effort is made to posit solutions to a
suggested problem.8 For argument's sake, if drafting the J.O.B.S. Act's
Title IV were to be revisited or reconsidered, I would suggest the
following:
184. See FORM 1-A-Regulation A Offering Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933,
pt. FIS, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/forml-a.pdf (form used in securities
offerings made pursuant to Regulation A).
185. See, e.g., Rutherford B. Campbell Jr., Regulation A: Small Business' Search for a
Moderate Capital, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. 77, 119-21 (2006) (discussing steps the commission
should take to make Regulation A useful for small businesses).
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A. Title IV Should Explicitly Preempt All State Blue Sky Law Filing
Requirements
Instead of Congress placing the onus on the Commission to hold the
line on state preemption, Congress in its drafting of the J.O.B.S. Act's Title
IV should have explicitly exempted all Regulation A offerings from state
registration and filing requirements. Its failure to do so is leading to
predicted and foreseeable results - litigation. By not preempting all
Regulation A filings explicitly through Title IV, state regulators see just
enough legal uncertainty to make colorable claims that the Commission has
overstepped its boundaries by creating a preemption that the Commission
did not have the legal authority to create. That gap in Title IV's language
has already sparked a trickle of lawsuits with the promise of more to
follow.
In this environment of legal uncertainty, potential issuers will more
than likely avoid the Regulation A exemption altogether. The last thing a
small business needs in its early stages is potentially costly litigation.8
If Congress simply re-writes preemption into the Act itself then the
whole interpretive fight that the Commission is currently facing goes by the
way side. A simple act of Congress is all that is needed to side step this
quagmire that will likely lead to ongoing and protracted litigation for the
foreseeable future.
B. The Fifty Million Dollar Cap Should be Lowered and the Annual
Audited Financial Statement Requirement Should not be a Part of
the Rule
Each available offering exemption is a combination of tradeoffs
between compliance costs to issuers and potential fraud exposure to
investors. Generally speaking, the higher the exposure risk is to investors,
the greater the compliance burden tends to be for the issuer.1 7 When one
offering exemption does a better job of balancing these two competing
concerns, issuers tend to gravitate toward that exemption choice and will
forego a more cumbersome option.
186. See Comment Letter from Rutherford B. Campbell, Jr. to Elizabeth M. Murphy,
SEC Sec'y (Nov. 13, 2012), http://www.sec.gov/comments/jobs-title-iv/jobstitleiv-18.pdf
(urging the Commission to preempt state securities laws in its rulemaking). The
Commission ultimately wholesale adopted this very approach to preempt state securities
laws in its rulemaking.
187. For example, Regulation D's Rule 504 caps the offering size at $1 million. 17
C.F.R. § 230.504(b)(2) (2015). In that instance, there are no investor qualifications nor is
the issuer required to make any financial statement disclosures to its investors.
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The problem with Regulation A is that it was out of balance at its
inception with very high compliance hurdles where the corresponding
benefit was capped at an offering size not to exceed five million dollars.'"
Though the J.O.B.S. Act has raised that cap to fifty million dollars for its
Tier 2 offerings, it also raised the corresponding compliance hurdles
causing Regulation A to continue to be out of balance between striking the
right mix between investor protection and appropriate reasonable
compliance requirements.
For Regulation A to have any possible appeal, the cost to meet its
compliance requirements must be in step with the benefits that can be
derived from choosing the exemption. The following then is suggested: to
make Regulation A a more viable offering exemption, the exemption must
accentuate those Regulation A aspects that make it unique from any other
exemption. Accordingly, the exemption must be crafted to emphasize
those unique Regulation A characteristics instead of blunting those
characteristics, which is what has happened with this current Regulation A
iteration under the J.O.B.S. Act and the Commission's final rulemaking.
Perhaps the two most unique Regulation A characteristics are the fact
that Regulation A has no investor qualification requirements and that the
issuer is allowed to advertise and solicit investors. As mentioned earlier,
anyone can invest in a Regulation A offering regardless of net worth,
income, or investor sophistication.'" As to the second characteristic, the
issuer is allowed to advertise and solicit investors and all of those solicited
investors are eligible to participate in the offering.' 90
By contrast, newly revised Regulation D Rule 506(c) also allows the
issuer to advertise and solicit investors, but the rule limits actual
participation in the offering to accredited investors.' 9' No other offering
exemption allowed issuers the choice of publicly soliciting investors and
keeping the pool of investors open to all regardless of financial
sophistication or accredited investor status. Accordingly, it should follow
that any Regulation A compliance or disclosure provisions should be
crafted to allow the issuer to exploit and accentuate these two unique
Regulation A offering characteristics. If Regulation A fails in this regard
(which has been the case historically), then potential issuers will simply
choose another exemption.
188. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.251(b) (2014) amended by 17 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2015)
(specifying five million dollar limit).
189. See generally 17 C.F.R. § 230.251-.263 (2015) (revealing no investor qualifications
or criteria in a review of Regulation A).
190. Id.
191. 17 C.F.R. § 230.506(c) (2015).
102 [Vol. 18:1
LET SLEEPING REGS LIE
To take such advantage, first the Regulation A cap should be lowered.
Fifty million dollars is too high and frankly is not necessary. If a company
has grown to such a size that it is in a position to do a fifty million dollar
offering, then the company is more likely suited for either a Rule 506
offering or perhaps even a public offering. Regulations A's Tier 2 offering
regime as it is currently written is comparable to a public offering with no
real discernible difference but for the fact that the Regulation A offering
circular goes through a qualification process, whereas a full blown public
offering would go through an SEC review process before being approved
and declared effective. What then would be the reason for choosing
Regulation A? What advantage would Regulation A provide that a full
blown IPO would not? If we are being hyper technical, some would say
that Regulation A allows the issuer to remain as a privately held company
if that is the issuer's choice. But in reality would there be any discernible
difference? If your offering is close to fifty million dollars, then it is more
than likely you have a significant number of investors comprising your
investor pool. A significantly large investor pool where each investor is
investing a nominal amount is the only explanation. If the situation is any
other, then Regulation A does not make sense where Rule 506 with no cap
and no SEC qualification or SEC review process is involved. Accordingly,
the fifty million dollar cap is too high and should be lowered.
The second suggestion would be to eliminate the audited financial
statement requirement for Tier 2 offerings. Under the J.O.B.S. Act
revisions for Tier 2 offerings, the issuer is required to include audited
financial statements along with its Form 1-A Offering Statement.1 92
Additionally, the issuer is required to file audited financial statements on an
ongoing annual basis.' 3  These audited financial statement requirements
beg the question, "What is the audited financial statement's purpose?"
Presumably, the purpose is to protect investors by providing them with
financial statements that have been vetted by an independent third party.
However, do audited financial statements make sense in the Regulation A
context? As stated earlier, Regulation A's unique characteristics allow the
issuer to publicly solicit investors and allow ANYONE regardless of their
wealth, income, or financial savvy to participate in the offering. Assuming
192. Regulation A Offering Statement under the Securities Act of 1933, Form 1-A, 17
C.F.R. § 239.90 (2015) prescribes the informational filing and disclosure requirements for
Regulation A offerings. 17 C.F.R. § 230.252(a) (2015). See 17 C.F.R. § 239.90 (requiring
the use of Form I-A for Regulation A offerings); S.E.C., Form I-A - Regulation A
Offering Statement Under the Securities Act of 1933, pt. FIS(c),
https://www.sec.gov/about/forms/formi-a.pdf, archived at https://perma.cclH6QP-GU3Q
(requiring audited financial statements for Tier 2 Regulation A offerings).
193. Id.
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this is the case, what then is the justification or necessity for audited
financial statements? Audited financial statements would be prepared for
an audience that likely has no interest in or is not otherwise inclined to read
them.
One could argue that the audited financial statement requirement is
there simply to act as an accountability check on the issuer. The
assumption being that if they are required to prepare and file audited
financial statements, then the likelihood that the issuer will act with
integrity towards its investors increases: a valid argument. But the
response hearkens back to the cost benefit assessment mentioned earlier.
An effective Regulation A space should be one for smaller companies
where the potential exposure to investors is limited by the company's size
and the amount being invested by any one investor. In other words, if the
parameters are set properly, then the protections are built in by the limited
size and scope. Here, in its effort to revive Regulation A, Congress has
stretched Regulation A beyond its intended borders. Accordingly, the cap
should be lowered from $50 million to a size small enough such that
removing the audited financial statement requirements can be justified.
The exact number should be one that results from a study of the matter and
an assessment as to where that "safe point" is realized. But $50 million is
too high.
C. Regulation A Should Have Only One Tier with All Filers Meeting
the Same Requirements
The Commission's final Regulation A rules should consist of one tier
only with all filers having to meet the same requirements. As discussed
earlier, the Commission's final Regulation A rules split the offering options
into two tiers; Tier I and Tier 2.1 Tier I is for offerings up to twenty
million dollars and Tier 2 is for offerings between twenty million dollars
and fifty million dollars. 95 The Tier 1 offering regime is exactly the same
as the pre J.O.B.S. Act requirements with the exception being that the limit
is raised from five million dollars to twenty million dollars.19 6 Also, Tier 2,
as discussed earlier, allows for offerings between twenty million dollars
and fifty million dollars but with rigorous disclosure requirements which
194. 17 C.F.R. § 230.25 1(a) (2015).
195. Id.
196. Compare 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(a)(1), .252, .257 (2015) with 17 C.F.R. § 230.251,
.252, .257 (effective to June 18, 2015) (showing that Tier 1 offerings only differ from the
previous, single-tier offering regime in aggregate amount of capital raised).
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include annual reporting and audited financial statements.' 97
The Commission's final rulemaking with Regulation A's two tiered
regime highlights the fundamental problem with Congress's attempt to re-
work Regulation A to begin with. The whole rule making endeavor was
done devoid of any focus or consideration for those that would be potential
Regulation A users. Regulation A's intended audience was to be SMALL
businesses; small meaning total assets more in the $50,000 - $5 million
range.198 Again, this is based on a review of the forty-two Regulation A
filings that were sampled for this article. Based on these numbers and
based on the Regulation A requirements, it is foreseeable that most of the
potential Regulation A filers would be in that Tier I category, the category
whose requirements are exactly the same as the pre J.O.B.S. Act version.
These are the same requirements that caused issuers to avoid Regulation A
in the first place.
The turf war between the state and federal regulators over this topic
has caused both sides to engage in a legislative and rule making process
resulting in no meaningful improvements to Regulation A whatsoever. The
same issuers that avoided Regulation A prior to the J.O.B.S. Act will
continue to avoid it under the Commission's revised rules because the same
onerous requirements remain. Any issuer who is in a position to offer
securities for more than twenty million dollars would have virtually no
reason to use Regulation A as there are other exemptions that work much
better for larger offerings.
The end result after the J.O.B.S. Act and the Commission's
subsequent rulemaking for Regulation A, is virtually no change as the large
majority of potential Regulation A filers would more than likely fall into
the Tier I category. This tier has the same disincentivizing provisions that
existed prior to the J.O.B.S. Act.
In sum, the suggestions are 1) re-write the J.O.B.S. Act provision and
explicitly allow for all state blue sky law preemption; 2) lower the $50
million cap to a level better suited for Regulation A and its intended
audience; 3) remove both the audited financial statement filing requirement
and the ongoing annual audited financial statement disclosure requirement;
and 4) have only one tier with all Regulation A filers meeting the same
requirements.
I continue to hold firm to the position that Regulation A was a flawed
exemption at inception and the proposed revisions will not change those
197. 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.251(a)(2), .257(b) (2015).
198. See Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (J.O.B.S. Act), Pub. L. No. 112-106, 126
Stat. 306, tit. IV (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) ("Small Company
Capital Formation").
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flaws. But, if Regulation A has any chance of succeeding, then state
preemption must be a part of the new rule and audited financial statements
in any capacity must be excluded. Again this is simply a matter of tailoring
the exemption's contours with the exemption itself. For whom was
Regulation A intended? What type of issuer and what type of investor?
From looking at the Rule's language, the intended investor was presumably
a small to mid-size company with assets in the zero to $5 million range. As
far as the investors are concerned, Regulation A was drafted to allow for
investors with little net worth, who earn modest incomes, and who have
little, if any, financial sophistication. Assuming that these are the types of
investors that the exemption contemplates, what is the need for audited
financial statements? For whom are these statements being prepared?
Likewise, what is the rationale for an offering size as high as $50 million?
Again, if a company has grown to the point where it is in a position to do a
$50 million offering, then it has out grown anything that Regulation A
would have to offer. This is a company that, at the very least, would either
be looking to do an offering under Rule 506 if not a full-blown public
offering.
Congress should have given more thought to its targeted investor. The
J.O.B.S. Act's current Regulation A revisions appear to have been done so
without regard for both its targeted issuers and targeted investors. Perhaps
a re-working with these two constituents in mind would lead to a better and
more thoughtful result. I still hold firm that Regulation A should be done
away with altogether. But if Regulation A is to have any chance at revival,
then some of those aspects should be revisited.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Regulation A was a flawed private offering exemption at its inception.
The offering exemption was intended to be available to issuers who wished
to include investors with modest income, modest net worth, and little, if
any, financial sophistication. But the problem with this targeted directive is
that investors in this demographic are generally too scarce to serve as a
viable demographic for most private offerings and likewise are too
problematic to be worth the trouble of courting.
Accordingly, the meager benefits for choosing the Regulation A route
are disproportionate compared to the cost involved in terms of both time
and money to comply. The modifications under the J.O.B.S. Act will do
little, if any, to rectify this imbalance. Regulation A was never intended to
be an exempt offering that allows for the raising of up to fifty million
dollars; especially where there are other exempt offering alternatives that
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are much better suited for offerings of this size. The added compliance
burdens of audited financial statements required both at filing and on an
annual basis again are compliance mandates that show Congress' lack of
regard for its targeted audience. Finally, even without all the problems
mentioned above, the whole state preemption debacle alone is enough to
cause issuers to tack away from Regulation A's potential quagmires. The
fight between the state regulators and the Commission over this issue is a
classic case of a political war being fought with no regard for practical
realities. If the state regulators ultimately win this fight, they will have
won a battle that will assure them losing the war as a state filing
requirement will almost assure Regulation A's continued dormancy and
eventual extinction. Regulation A was a flawed offering exemption at its
inception. Sometimes the most appropriate thing to do is to let sleeping
regulations lie.
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APPENDIX: PART A
NOTE: 42 Regulation A filings were reviewed. Specific information was
gathered and summarized in Part B of this Appendix.
Company Name Filing Date
1. EQUITYPOINT, LLC FILING DATE: 12-2008
2. OAKLEYS SHOOTING FILING DATE: 2-2009
RANGE, INC.
3. LYONS BANCORP, INC. FILING DATE: 2-23-2004
4. THE GODSPELL LLC FILING DATE: 2-23-2010
5. RESONANT SOFWARE, INC. FILING DATE: 2-2009
6. RICHLAND RESOURCES FILING DATE: 8-2010
CORP.
7. FREE MOVERS, INC. FILING DATE: 7-2010
8. ABL FILM AND FILING DATE: 3-2010
ENTERTAINMENT CORP.
9. RECOVERY ENTERPRISES, FILING DATE: 7-31-2009
INC.
10. REAL SPORTS FILING DATE: 2-26-2008
INVESTMENTS, LLC
11. ACTIONVIEW FILING DATE: 3-10-2010
INTERNATIONAL, INC.
12. MNB TECHNOLOGIES, FILING DATE: 8-17-2011
INC.
13. LONE MOUNTAIN MINING FILING DATE: 3-25-2009
COMPANY
14. JUMPSTART MARKETING, FILING DATE: 12-18-2008
INC.
15. LIGHTSPEED SYSTEMS, FILING DATE: 6-2008
INC.
16. EARTHMETRIX FILING DATE: 2-2008
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
17. EMERGING GROWTH FILING DATE: 6-2009
FUNDING, INC.
18. FREEDOM MOTORS, INC. FILING DATE: 5-2011
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19. CARDIOMEDICS, INC. FILING DATE: 2-2009
20. ENERGY CONSERVATION FILING DATE: 11-2008
TECHNOLOGIES, INC.
21. EL CHUPACABRA, INC. FILING DATE: 5-19-2010
22. THE CARLYLE ULTRA, FILING DATE: 11-2010
INC.
23. EQUITYPOINT, LLC FUND FILING DATE: 8-2008
I SERIES
24. HOME DECORATION, INC. FILING DATE: 8-2009
25. GILPIN COMPUTER FILING DATE: 2-2009
CONSULTANTS, INC.
26. BANK OF IDAHO FILING DATE: 6-2010
HOLDING CO.
27. AFRO DOLLAR INC. FILING DATE: 10-17-2011
28. ACTIVE CARE AT BRESSI FILING DATE: 7-13-2011
RANCH LLC.
29. BIDDEFORD AND SACO FILING DATE: 5-28-2010
WATER CO.
30. AGRI-LABORATORIES, FILING DATE: 6-17-2008
LTD.
31. ENTERTAINMENT ARTS FILING DATE: 4-28-2010
RESEARCH, INC.
32. ENVIRO-SERV, INC. FILING DATE: 5-20-2014
33. METATRON, INC. FILING DATE: 5-1-2014
34. NETWORKED FILING DATE: 5-6-2014
EMERGENCY SYSTEMS, INC.
35. MANEGAIN, INC. FILING DATE: 5-6-2014
36. CYBER HOLDINGS, INC. FILING DATE: 5-3-2014
37. EASTON FILING DATE: 5-15-2014
PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
38. CREDITSMARTPRO, INC. FILING DATE: 5-7-2014
39. COMMONWEALTH NEW FILING DATE: 5-6-2014
ERA RACING, LLC.
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40. CODE NAVY FILING DATE: 4-17-2014
41. BIOSCULPTURE FILING DATE: 5-8-2014
TECHNOLOGY, INC.
42. ALAMO PARTNERS, LLC FILING DATE: 3-14-2014
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APPENDIX: PART B
NOTE: Part B is a summary of information gathered on seven specific
categories. These categories were used to assess the type of investor the
filer was seeking to participate in its offering.
INVESTOR COMPANY NUMBER AND NAME
CRITERIA/
CATEGORY
1.
Issuer limits offering 1. EQUITYPOINT, LLC (See Exhibit C -
to accredited Subscription Agreement- Section B, pg. 99 -
Investors only "Investor Qualification" - Investor required to
attest to accredited investor criteria such as
individual income greater than $200,000 or net
worth greater than $1,000,000)
6. RICHLAND RESOURCES CORP. (Shares
being offered exclusively to Texas residents
who are accredited investors. Offering
Statement, pg. 4)
23. EQUITYPOINT, LLC FUND I SERIES
(See Exhibit C - Subscription Agreement-
Section B, pg. 99 - "Investor Qualification" -
Investor required to attest to accredited
investor criteria such as individual income
greater than $200,000 or net worth greater
than $1,000,000)
32. ENVIRO-SERV, INC. (Offering made
primarily to one large investor committed to
purchasing $1,000,000 of the $1,500,000
worth of shares being offered. (pg. 12). The
investor attested to being an accredited
investor as set forth in the Investment
Agreement § 3.4, pg. 67)
33. METRATON, INC. (Offering made
primarily to one large investor committed to
purchasing all of the $1,500,000 worth of
shares being offered. (pg. 11). The investor
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attested to being an accredited investor as set
forth in the Investment Agreement § 3.4, pg.
94)
37. EASTON PHARMACEUTICALS INC.
(Offering made primarily to one large investor
committed to purchasing up to $5,000,000 of
the $5,000,000 worth of shares being offered.
(pg. 13). The investor attested to being an
accredited investor as set forth in the
Investment Agreement § 3.4, pg. 114)
2.
Issuer limits offering 9. RECOVERY ENTERPRISE, INC. (Investor
to "Sophisticated must attest to being knowledgeable and
Investors" experienced in finance, securities, and
investments. See Exhibit 4- Subscription
Agreement section 2.1(C) - pg. 74)
11. ACTIONVIEW INTERNATIONAL, INC.
(Investor must attest to being knowledgeable
and experienced in finance and business
matters. See Exhibit 4.1 - Subscription
Agreement - § 3.3)
15. LIGHTSPEED SYSTEMS, INC. (See
Exhibit 4 - Subscription Agreement, Section
4(c) - pg. 119 - Investor attesting to having
knowledge and experience in financial and
business matters)
38. ENERGY CONSERVATION
TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (See Subscription
Agreement, Section 4(c) - pg. 52 - Investor
attesting to having knowledge and experience
in financial and business matters)
3.
Issuer limits offering 4. THE GODSPELL, LLC (Investor must have
to investors who a minimum net worth of $60,000 (exclusive of
have a net worth of house, furniture, and automobiles) and must
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at least have an annual gross income of at least
$225,000 and an $60,000. Alternatively, the investor must have
income of at least a liquid net worth of at least $225,000. See
$60,000 Offering Circular Summary, pg. 11)
28. ACTIVE CARE AT BRESSI RANCH
LLC. (Net worth greater than $250,000 or
income greater than $70,000 and a net worth
of at least $70,000. See Offering Statement,
pg. 3 "Who May Invest" section)
4.
1. EQUITYPOINT, LLC (minimum investment
of $2,500 - Exhibit C - Subscription
Agreement - Section A - pg. 94)
4. THE GODSPELL, LLC (minimum
investment of $1,000. Part II-Offering
Circular, pg. 5)
9. RECOVERY ENTERPRISES, INC.
(minimum investment of $1,200. Part II
Offering Circular, pg. 8)
20. ENERGY CONSERVATION
TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (Minimum
investment of $11,000. See Part II
"Preliminary" Offering Circular, pg. 7)
23. EQUITYPOINT, LLC FUND I SERIES
(minimum investment of $2,500 - Exhibit C -
Subscription Agreement - Section A - pg. 93)
26. BANK OF IDAHO HOLDING CO.
(minimum investment for new shareholders is
$249,750. See Offering Statement, pg. 12,
first page of Preliminary Offering Circular)
27. AFRO DOLLAR INC. (minimum investment
of $1,000. See Offering Statement, pg. 8)
Minimum
investment of
$1,000 or more
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28. ACTIVE CARE AT BRESSI RANCH
LLC. (minimum purchase requirement of 20
units at $1,000 per unit ($20,000). See
Offering Statement - Preliminary Offering
Circular, pg. 1)
29. BIDDEFORD AND SACO WATER CO.
(minimum investment is 1 unit for $10,000 per
unit. See Offering Statement - Part II -
Offering Circular - pg. 4)
42. ALAMO PARTNERS, LLC (minimum
investment amount of $10,000 per subscriber.
See Offering Circular, pg. 19)
5.
Offerings prepared 7. FREE MOVERS, INC. (offering statement
without counsel's handwritten; space left blank as to issuer's
assistance counsel. See Offering Statement, Part I, Item
1(h), pg. 2)
10. REAL SPORTS INVESTMENT LLC
(offering statement handwritten; no issuer's
counsel listed. See Offering Statement, Part I,
Item 1(h), pg. 2)
11. ACTION VIEW INTERNATIONAL, INC.
(offering notes specifically that counsel was
not engaged to draft offering statement. See
Offering Statement - Part I - Item 1
Significant parties - pg. 2)
12. MNB TECHNOLOGIES, INC. ("none"
noted for issuer's counsel. See Offering
Statement, Part I, Item 1(h), pg. 2)
17. EMERGING GROWTH FUNDING, INC.
(issuer's counsel not listed. See Offering
Statement, Part I, Item 1(h), pg. 3)
22. THE CARLYLE ULTRA, INC. (issuer's
counsel listed as "n/a." See Offering
114 [Vol. 18:1
LET SLEEPING REGS LIE
Statement, Part I, Item 1(h), pg. 3)
24. HOME DECORATION, INC. (offering
statement handwritten; issuer's counsel listed
as "n/a." See Offering Statement, Part I, Item
1(h), pg. 2)
25. GILPIN COMPUTER CONSULTANTS,
INC. (issuer's counsel listed as "none." See
Offering Statement, Part I, Item 1(h), pg. 2)
27. AFRO DOLLAR INC. (offering statement
handwritten; "none" listed next to issuer's
counsel. See Offering Statement, Part I, Item
1(h), pg. 3)
42. ALAMO PARTNERS, LLC ("none" noted
under issuer's counsel. See Offering
Statement, Part I, Item 1(c), pg. 2)
6.
1. EQUITYPOINT, LLC (See "Plan of
Clear intention Distribution," pg. 23 - Plan to offer 200,000
of doing public preferred units to the public)
solicitation
4. THE GODSPELL LLC (securities being
offered to residents of New York, California,
Connecticut, Illinois, Louisiana,
Massachusetts, Michigan. Managing members
will be offering securities through solicitation,
word of mouth, and the internet. See Offering
Statement, Part I, Item 4, pg. 3)
19. CARDIOMEDICS, INC. (company states
explicitly that it is offering its shares to the
public at a price of $1.00 per share. See "The
Offering & Plan of Distribution. Offering
Statement, Part I, pg. 13)
21. EL CHUPACABRA, INC. (shares being
offered through Internet to residents of
California, New York, and Pennsylvania. See
Offering Statement, Part I, ITEM 4, pg. ii)
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22. THE CARLYLE ULTRA, INC. (securities
being sold through nationally registered and
sanctioned brokerages and may eventually be
listed through other public mediums. See
Offering Statement, Part I, ITEM 4, pp. 3-4)
23. EQUITYPOINT, LLC FUND I SERIES
(securities being offered to residents of
Indiana, Illinois, Kentucky, Massachusetts,
Delaware. Managers plan on advertising
using billboard, radio and television,
advertisements, and newspapers. Offering
Statement, Part I Item 4 - pg. 2)
25. GILPIN COMPUTER CONSULTANTS,
INC. (shares being offered to all 50 U.S.
states. See Offering Statement, Part I - Item
4, pg. 2)
27. AFRO DOLLAR INC. (shares being offered
to residents of Illinois, Alabama, California,
Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland,
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri,
New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia,
Wisconsin, Washington D.C. See Part II -
Offering Circular, pg. 13)
31. ENTERTAIMENT ARTS RESEARCH
INC. (Distribution plan includes sales on
public markets and exchanges. pg. 25)
7.
Filings that were 10. REAL SPORTS INVESTMENT LLC
actively seeking (Company specifically targeting sports fans
investors regardless due to the fact they (sports fans) will have the
of income, net most knowledge and interest in a security
worth, or financial encompassing RSI's business model. See
sophistication Offering Statement, Part II Offering Circular,
"BUSINESS AND PROPERTIES" section)
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18. FREEDOM MOTORS, INC. (Company has
no minimum investment amount and its shares
were being offered at $2.50 per share. See
"Plan of Distribution" section in Part II -
Offering Circular, pg. 13)
19. CARDIOMEDICS, INC. (Shares being
offered for $1.00 per share with no minimum
investment amount. See Offering Statement,
pg. 13)
